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MANIPULATING RISK: IMMIGRATION DETENTION THROUGH 
AUTOMATION
by
Kate Evans! & Robert Koulish∗∗
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security arrests as many as 500,000 migrants 
per year and detains more than 350,000 of them through Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE). Since 2012, ICE has relied on an automated Risk Classification 
Assessment (RCA) system to recommend whom to detain and whom to release. The 
authors are the first to obtain access to its algorithm and this Article is the first to make 
that system’s methodology public. While purportedly basing these recommendations on 
indicia of flight risk and risk to public safety, the RCA in fact relies on an algorithm 
driven by political preferences. By linking detention to enforcement policy rather than 
risk, the RCA lost its underpinning in the Constitution. In addition, compromises in 
its logic thwarted the program’s ability to deliver the harm reduction, transparency, and 
uniformity it promised. Ultimately, our data and analysis reveal that manipulation of 
the RCA resulted in automated detention recommendations for hundreds of thousands 
of people in violation of the Constitution. The RCA thus delivers mass incarceration 
of immigrants with staggering efficiency. In the end, we argue the RCA supplied a 
veneer of risk to a tool of punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operates the largest 
immigration detention system in the world.! The agency holds nearly 45,000 adult 
migrants on any given day" and booked more than 373,000 people into detention 
in the 2019 fiscal year.# These numbers are only growing, with Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) holding almost 50,000 adult migrants in detention 
every day as of March 2019$ and the Trump Administration seeking funding to 
1 See United States Immigration Detention Profile, GLOB. DET. PROJECT (May 2016), 
https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/americas/united-states.
2 ICE reported to Congress that, as of October 2018, the average daily population in 
detention had reached 44,631 people. The number was not made available to the public but was 
confirmed to the Daily Beast by a congressional office. See Spencer Ackerman, ICE is Imprisoning 
a Record 44,000 People, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 12, 2018, 2:27 PM), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/ice-is-imprisoning-a-record-44000-people.
3 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2019 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS REPORT 5 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 ICE REPORT].
4 See Kate Sullivan & Jeff Mason, Immigration Detention in the United States: A Primer,
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 24, 2019), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/immigration-
detention-in-the-united-states-a-primer/. From 2009 until 2017, the country’s immigration 
detention system was maintained through Congress’s “bed mandate,” which required that ICE 
maintain a certain number of beds for detention every day to detain migrants and provided 
corresponding funding. See Detention Quotas, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://
www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/issues/detention-quotas (last visited Mar. 5, 2020). In the last 
year of the bed mandate, Congress required that DHS have at least 34,000 beds available. See id.;
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Division F, Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2493, 2497–98 (2015). While the law 
did not require ICE to actually fill these beds, the bed mandate may have provided an incentive 
to keep them full, pushing some members of Congress to seek its end. See id.; Letter from 
Members of Congress to John Carter, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
Appropriations, and Lucille Roybal-Allard, Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security Appropriations (March 15, 2016), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/
immigrantjustice.org/files/FY17AppropsHouseQuotaLetter2016_03_15_1.pdf. While Congress 
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increase this number to 52,000.%
The costs of maintaining such an expansive detention system are enormous. 
The bill to taxpayers is $208 per night per person, or more than $3 billion a year.&
The toll on detained migrants and their families is far higher with the death count 
on the rise,' inadequate medical care and unhealthy conditions,( claims of slave 
no longer requires ICE to maintain this minimum number of beds, it has provided funding for 
more and more beds as DHS ramps up detainment. See Muzaffar Chishti, et al., Executive Power 
Showdown: Congress and White House Quarrel over Immigration Spending, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Feb. 
28, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/executive-power-showdown-congress-
white-house-immigration. The recent immigration bill provides funding to detain a daily average 
of 45,724 people, more than at any time before. Id.; Dara Lind, Congress’s Deal on Immigration 
Detention, Explained, VOX (Feb. 12, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/12/
18220323/immigration-detention-beds-congress-cap. Although this funding is contingent on 
DHS eventually reducing the number of detained persons to 40,520, the bill allows DHS to 
reprogram funds it deems necessary from other departments, so long as it notifies Congress. See
Chishti, supra. In September 2018, Sen. Jeff Merkley released an internal document showing that 
DHS had re-appropriated some $200 million, including $10 million from FEMA’s budget, to 
cover additional detention costs. See Camila Domonoske, Trump Administration Transferred 
$9.8 Million from FEMA to ICE, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 12, 2018, 
1:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/12/647021316/trump-administration-transferred-9-
8-million-from-fema-to-ice. 
5 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF 4 (2019); Lind, supra note 4.
6 Laurence Benenson, The Math of Immigration Detention, 2018 Update: Costs Continue to Multiply
(May 9, 2018), https://immigrationforum.org/article/math-immigration-detention-2018-update-
costs-continue-mulitply/.
7 An NBC analysis of federal data found that 24 people have died in ICE custody during 
the Trump administration, not including at least four others who died shortly after being released 
from ICE custody, or those that died in the custody of other federal agencies. See Hannah 
Rappleye & Lisa Riordan Seville, 24 Immigrants Have Died in ICE Custody During the Trump 
Administration, NBC NEWS (June 9, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
immigration/24-immigrants-have-died-ice-custody-during-trump-administration-n1015291. 
Twelve people died in the 2017 fiscal year alone, more than any year since 2009, with 14 fatalities. 
In almost all of the death reports there was evidence of “dangerous and subpar medical care 
practices.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ET AL., CODE RED: THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
DANGEROUSLY SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL CARE IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 3, 39 (2018).
8 On June 3, 2019, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) released the results of an 
investigation into conditions at four ICE detention facilities. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-19-47, CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND 
CARE AT FOUR DETENTION FACILITIES (2019) [hereinafter OIG-19-47]. It found violations of 
food health and safety standards at all four centers, such as “spoiled and moldy food in kitchen 
refrigerators, as well as food past its expiration date.” Id. at 3. Three facilities infringed on detainee 
rights by employing inappropriate segregation practices, such as the use of restraints, premature 
disciplinary segregation, and strip-searching. Id. at 5. Conditions at two of the facilities in 
Adelanto, CA and Essex County, NJ were so egregious that the Inspector issued separate reports 
for each. Id. at 3. Bathrooms at both facilities were in “poor condition, including mold and peeling 
paint on walls, floors, and showers, and unusable toilets.” Id. at 8. In Adelanto, homemade nooses 
were found in 15 of 20 cells visited. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
OIG-18-86, MANAGEMENT ALERT—ISSUES REQUIRING ACTION AT THE ADELANTO ICE
PROCESSING CENTER IN ADELANTO, CALIFORNIA 2 (2018). Guards reported that suicides were 
not a “high priority,” despite at least seven attempted suicides there in less than a year. Id. at 3–4. 
At the same facility, detainees reported not being given prescriptions, not receiving urgent care, 
and waiting weeks or months to see a doctor. Id. at 8. In Essex County, inspectors found that 
detainees were being served raw, rotten, or expired food, leading to episodes of severe food 
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wages and coerced labor,) and restricted access to counsel and loved ones.!* DHS 
poisoning. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-19-20, ISSUES 
REQUIRING ACTION AT THE ESSEX COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY IN NEWARK, NEW JERSEY,
at 4–6 (2019). 
9 Detention centers are subject to an ICE detention standard called the Voluntary Work 
Program, which claims to give detainees the “opportunit[y] to work and earn money while 
confined . . . .” U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION 
STANDARDS 2011, at 405 (revised 2016). However, immigrant advocates say that “voluntary” is a 
misnomer, as the program in reality means forced labor. See Victoria Law, Investigation: Corporations 
Are Profiting from Immigrant Detainees’ Labor. Some Say It’s Slavery., IN THESE TIMES (May 29, 2018), 
http://inthesetimes.com/features/ice_immigrant_detention_centers_forced_prison_labor_inve
stigation.html. For one, the pay scale for the Voluntary Work Program has not changed since its 
codification in 1978. Seth H. Garfinkel, The Voluntary Work Program: Expanding Labor Laws to Protect 
Detained Immigrant Workers, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1278, 1288 (2017). These corporations are 
permitted to pay detainees as little as $1 per hour to clean toilets, do laundry, and prepare food, 
saving them the necessity of paying minimum wage to non-detainee workers and allowing them 
to minimize labor costs and maximize profits. See Department of State Appropriation Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-86, 91 Stat. 419, 426 (1977); Law, supra. There are currently at least five lawsuits 
pending against the nation’s largest for-profit detention center operators, CoreCivic and GEO 
Group. See id. According to the complaints, the corporations violated the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act, as well as other federal and state minimum wage and trafficking laws, by forcing 
detainees to work for almost nothing under threats of solitary confinement, retaliation, and the 
withholding of basic items. See First Amended Complaint at 2–4, Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 
17-CV-01112-JLS-NLS, 2018 WL 7568335 (S.D. Cal. Oct 12, 2018); Complaint for Declaratory 
& Injunctive Relief & Damages at 1–2, Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-00070-CDL 
(M.D. Ga. Apr. 17, 2018); Original Complaint and Class Action at 1, Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., 
No. 1:18-cv-00169 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2018); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief & 
Damages at 2, Novoa v. Geo Group, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-02514 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2017); Class 
Action Complaint for Unpaid Wages and Forced Labor at 1, Menocal v. Geo Group, Inc., No. 
1:14-cv-02887 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2014).
10 The OIG found that one facility routinely denied detainees in-person visits. See OIG-19-
47, supra note 8, at 11. Long wait times and high costs can make it very difficult for loved ones to 
even call detainees. See Shannon Najmabadi, Detained Migrant Parents Have to Pay to Call Their Family 
Members. Some Can’t Afford to., TEX. TRIB. (July 3, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/
07/03/separated-migrant-families-charged-phone-calls-ice/. Access to counsel is also an issue, 
and is crucial to affecting immigration outcomes, especially among detainees. In a study of 1.2 
million deportation cases between 2007 and 2012, only 2% of detained respondents without a 
lawyer had a successful case outcome, compared with 21% of those with a lawyer. Ingrid V. Eagly 
& Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 50 
(2015). However, detained immigrants are far less likely to secure a lawyer than non-detained 
immigrants. In the same study, only 14% of detained respondents, as compared to 66% of non-
detained respondents, were able to secure counsel. Id. at 32. This means non-detained respondents 
were almost five times more likely to obtain counsel than those detained. Id. Even when granted 
additional time to find counsel, only 36% of detained respondents seeking counsel found it, 
compared to two-thirds of non-detained respondents. Id. at 34. Location alone poses a significant 
barrier to obtaining legal aid. According to an analysis of 70 detention centers, 30% of detained 
immigrants are held more than 100 miles away from the nearest government-listed legal aid 
resource. Kyle Kim, Immigrants Held in Remote ICE Facilities Struggle to Find Legal Aid Before They’re 
Deported, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 28, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-access-to-counsel-
deportation/. There have also been complaints that some ICE detention centers make it almost 
impossible for detainees to communicate with attorneys. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive & 
Declaratory Relief at 3–4, Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 5:18-cv-02604 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 14, 2018) (alleging that two detention centers in California severely limited access to 
telephone calls and private consultation rooms); Letter from Eunice Cho, Staff Attorney, 
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has had to justify the scale of immigration detention in the face of these mounting 
costs. To do so, it turned to automation.!!
In 2011, DHS developed the Risk Classification Assessment (RCA)—the 
largest risk assessment tool in the country!"—as part of its expanding detention 
apparatus. The RCA would, in theory, measure a migrant’s flight risk and risk to 
public safety in order to decide whether ICE should detain the individual.!# The 
RCA would thereby align immigration detention with overall risk. The use of a 
standardized risk assessment to determine the use of civil immigration detention 
would address criticisms from inside and outside the government that the 
conditions of immigration detention and criminal incarceration had become 
indistinguishable.!$ By calibrating the use and conditions of detention to the civil 
immigration context through risk theory, detained migrants with a low risk to public 
safety would not be treated like incarcerated criminals. Additionally, an automated 
risk tool would ensure that civil detention was tied to its limited constitutional 
purpose: restricting only those migrants who represented a risk of danger to others 
or a risk of absconding from immigration enforcement. The RCA would function 
to simultaneously limit and justify DHS’s detention decisions on a national scale. 
Policymakers touted the tool as promoting uniformity, transparency, and 
rationality in immigration detention.!% The RCA’s proponents also promised the 
tool would screen out individuals whose health status, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, or caregiving responsibilities would make detention particularly harmful 
to them or others.!& Scholars and immigrant advocates hoped that the RCA would 
push ICE to use alternatives to detention with much greater frequency and thereby 
serve as a check on detention rates.!' In reality, however, we show that the RCA’s 
Southern Poverty Law Center, to Government Officials and Stewart Detention Center (March 
21, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/final_version-letter_re_access_to_
counsel-stewart_detention_center.pdf (alleging that a detention center in Georgia did not permit 
attorneys to schedule calls or appointments with their clients in advance; refused to allow clients 
to call their attorneys for free; and routinely denied, limited, and delayed in-person attorney visits).
11 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE 
ENFORCEMENT INTEGRATED DATABASE (EID) RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT (RCA 1.0),
ENFORCE ALIEN REMOVAL MODULE (EARM 5.0), AND CRIME ENTRY SCREEN (CES 2.0) 13
(April 6, 2012) [hereinafter PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT].
12 Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 45, 51 (2014).
13 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-15-22, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION (REVISED) 4–5
(Feb. 4, 2015) [hereinafter OIG-15-22].
14 DR. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 20 (2009).
15 See Release of Criminal Detainees by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Policy or Politics?: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 16 (2013) [hereinafter Morton Testimony]
(written testimony of John Morton, ICE Director).
16 Id. 
17 See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 377 
(2013) (testimony of Eleanor Acer, Director, Refugee Protection Program, Human Rights First, 
recommending the use of a “risk classification assessment tool to identify and properly place any 
detainees who present safety risks in custody”); MIGRATION & REFUGEE SERVS., ET AL.,
UNLOCKING HUMAN DIGNITY: A PLAN TO TRANSFORM THE U.S. IMMIGRANT DETENTION 
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method for determining risk was compromised from the start and further 
manipulated over time.
In response to the authors’ Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and 
subsequent litigation in federal court, DHS released the RCA’s original risk 
assessment algorithms, changes to its scoring rubrics, all training materials, and 
detailed results in thousands of cases. These results reveal the factors the RCA uses 
to measure risk to public safety and risk of flight, how these factors are weighed and 
combined, and how the RCA balances risk with vulnerability. Consequently, we can 
see which characteristics are most likely to result in immigration detention and how 
the RCA’s algorithm was modified to shift dramatically which characteristics were 
tied to detention. This Article makes public for the first time the methodology of 
the RCA and its implications for nearly 400,000 migrants every year. After analyzing 
this data, we arrive at five major conclusions. 
First, the RCA failed to deliver on its fundamental promise to rationalize the 
use of civil detention by aligning it with risk. During the RCA’s nationwide rollout, 
ICE supervisors were told they could override the system’s risk-based custody 
recommendations based on preexisting local policy concerning detention and bond. 
The RCA’s logic was thus shackled from the outset. Further, the RCA’s algorithm 
was modified to reduce the rate at which supervisors overrode the RCA 
recommendation. Through changes to the scores assigned to certain criminal 
offenses and to the thresholds defining each risk level, the RCA was altered so that 
characteristics previously designated as representing a low risk of danger were 
deemed moderate risks. In addition, the algorithm for the RCA’s ultimate 
recommendations was reconfigured to limit the risk categories for which it 
recommended release or bond and instead commit these decisions to the discretion 
of ICE supervisors in the first instance. This change came at the expense of its core 
purpose. The customary use of immigration detention drove changes to the RCA 
methodology rather than the reverse. Moreover, many of the flight risk factors were 
eventually abandoned and replaced with factors tied to enforcement priorities, not 
SYSTEM 14 (2015) (“While the RCA generally seeks to assess dangerousness, flight risk and 
vulnerability . . . ICE has not publicized the actual (evolving) criteria used to make ‘automated’ 
custody and placement decisions. Thus, it remains difficult to assess whether this new 
enforcement tool will meaningfully alter custody rates and placement patterns, or will instead 
automatize continued overreliance on detention.”); Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information 
Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 162–63 (2013) (arguing that a 
potential risk assessment tool’s “impact is limited. Where it does apply, its effectiveness will 
undoubtedly turn on which criteria are used and how these criteria are weighted. In reviewing an 
early version of the tool, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees expressed concern 
that the tool ‘risks becoming a bureaucratic, tick-box exercise and may lead only to artificial 
individual assessments rather than real ones’ and that its methodology ‘appears heavily weighted 
in favour of detention.’”); Robert Koulish & Mark Noferi, Unlocking Immigrant Detention Reform,
BALT. SUN (Feb. 20, 2013, 1:47 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-
immigrant-detention-20130220-story.html (“ICE’s new risk-assessment technology allows 
Congress to take those three steps—ending mandatory detention; imposing criteria and 
decreasing funding for discretionary detention; and enacting civil detention standards—while 
empirically demonstrating the lack of additional risk.”); see also Robert Koulish, Immigration 
Detention in the Risk Classification Assessment Era, 16 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 29 (2017) (discussing 
complications to detention reform presented by supervisor review); Noferi & Koulish, supra note 
12, at 50.
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risk. The RCA became a vehicle to impose detention on the executive branch’s least 
favored migrants, regardless of whether they presented a risk to public safety or a 
risk of flight.
Second, the RCA failed to standardize detention decisions. Training materials 
emphasized that the RCA did not supplant local bond and custody policy. Instead, 
supervisors were instructed to override the system’s risk-based recommendations 
when they conflicted with local policy. Moreover, migrants with moderate risk 
profiles did not receive an RCA recommendation for detention or release. The RCA 
designated custody decisions for migrants with moderate risks to the supervisors in 
the first instance. Consequently, the RCA did not require a standardized process or 
outcome for a broad swath of individuals. By accepting supervisor overrides for 
entire categories of migrants and engineering the “supervisor to determine” 
outcome for moderate-risk individuals, the RCA sacrificed standardization from the 
start.
Third, the RCA lacks transparency at every level. Obtaining the methodology 
DHS uses to determine risk took four years and multiple rounds of litigation and 
negotiation. The risk tool thus lacks fundamental oversight and validation by 
external experts. Internally, the RCA’s methodology is also veiled. Though its 
detention recommendations are based on risk in name, in reality the factors that 
generate a “risk” level reflect enforcement priorities instead. As a result, supervisors 
who are reviewing the RCA’s custody recommendations see enforcement goals 
masquerading as risk. Additionally, the RCA outcome is kept secret from the 
immigration judges who review ICE’s custody determinations, advocates who 
represent individuals in these custody challenges, and migrants themselves. ICE 
officers administering the RCA therefore face little accountability for their mistakes 
and DHS attorneys do not have to defend the detention methodology to 
adjudicators. Indeed, errors in the RCA’s mandatory detention rubric mean that 
individuals with removal charges related to domestic violence or orders of 
protection have been erroneously classified as mandatorily detained, even though 
Congress excluded these charges from the mandatory detention statute. Individuals 
subject to this error are forced to persist in demanding review by an immigration 
judge, even though the detention determination ICE provides them says they are 
ineligible for review.
Fourth, the RCA is ill equipped to reduce harm. Poor screening mechanisms, 
the broad scope of supervisory discretion, and the absence of any structured 
communication between RCA administrators and officers in detention facilities 
regarding vulnerabilities and harm identified result in limited progress against this 
goal. Indeed, according to DHS’s own figures, ICE detained 63% of individuals 
who were not subject to mandatory detention and possessed a special vulnerability. 
Despite officials’ promises to address the increased risk of death, disease, and injury 
immigration detention presents to vulnerable migrants and the harm imposed on
others through detention of primary caregivers, nearly two-thirds of this group were 
forced to confront these harms in immigration detention.
Finally, in light of the RCA’s manipulation and misdirection away from risk, 
the result is a system that recommends unconstitutional civil detention for hundreds 
of thousands of people. The Supreme Court has accepted immigration detention, 
including automatic detention for certain categories of migrants, when detention is 
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rooted in flight risk and dangerousness. The use of the RCA as a political tool to 
impose detention based on characteristics unrelated to risk rendered it unlawful. 
The fact that the RCA employs the nomenclature of risk, but not its logic, has 
obscured this fundamental infirmity.
In 2011, DHS set out to address the harm and arbitrariness that characterized 
immigration detention. A decade later, it has still failed to do so. At present, the 
RCA automates a system of unconstitutional detention. Instead of dramatically 
reducing the rate of detention by recognizing the low risks presented by immigrants, 
as advocates and scholars had hoped, the tool cloaked mass incarceration in the 
language of risk. As such, its use to inflict detention on the least favored immigrants, 
without regard to risk, provides further support for calls to dismantle the 
immigration detention system in its entirety.!(
To explain the RCA’s methodology and the conclusions that result, this Article
proceeds in five parts. Part I and an accompanying appendix describe the process 
required to obtain this data. Part II reviews how the RCA is deployed throughout 
the immigration enforcement system and its role in determining the custody of 
hundreds of thousands of migrants. In Part III, we describe the RCA’s algorithm 
and its manipulation over time. Part IV of the Article evaluates the RCA against 
each of its purported goals to demonstrate how the system fails to deliver rationality, 
uniformity, transparency, or harm reduction in immigration detention. We conclude 
in Part V that the RCA’s algorithm at inception and through its subsequent 
manipulation imposed unconstitutional detention at a scale and speed made 
possible through automation.
I.  THE FOIA ODYSSEY
The authors are making the results of their FOIA requests public for the first 
time through this Article and the electronic repository of DHS’s response.!) To 
explain the nature and scope of the RCA documents now available, this Part reviews 
the categories of materials sought. It also summarizes the administrative and judicial 
challenges that were necessary to force production of any information concerning 
the RCA and its methodology. An appendix to this Article describes the FOIA 
process in greater detail, with citations to the various administrative and federal 
court filings, for the benefit of those readers facing similar obstacles to enforcing 
government transparency. Above all, this Section demonstrates DHS’s deep-seated 
recalcitrance to any oversight of its detention decisions.
Extracting information about the RCA’s scale and methodology required 
extensive FOIA requests, several rounds of administrative appeals, federal district 
court litigation with pro bono counsel, and a protracted settlement agreement, all of 
which took more than six years. The process began in 2011, as the RCA was piloted 
18 See generally CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON:
AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS (2019) (describing the historical origins 
and deployment of the immigration prison system).
19 See CONSOLIDATED RCA FOIA DOCUMENT RELEASE 2016-ICLI-00018, DUKE L.
SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY [hereinafter CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES], https://scholarship.
law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3994/.
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in ICE’s Baltimore and Washington field offices."* Professors Robert Koulish and 
Mark Noferi filed FOIA requests for the results of the new RCA system in these 
two locations."! DHS initially released several batches of RCA detailed summaries 
in the form of a one- or two-page printout of the RCA outcome for each migrant. 
These summaries showed that the RCA was comprised of separate modules that 
assess a migrant’s flight risk and risk to public safety, as well as whether the 
individual has a “special vulnerability” or is subject to mandatory detention. The 
summaries also revealed that the RCA combined the results of each module in some 
way to produce an overall recommendation regarding whether to detain the migrant, 
whether to set a bond, and if so, for what amount."" A supervisor then reviewed the 
RCA recommendation and either approved or modified the result."# The RCA 
summaries, however, did not disclose the method used to measure or combine flight 
risk, dangerousness, special vulnerabilities, or mandatory detention."$
To address the core question of how DHS decides who to detain, the authors 
submitted five separate requests in the fall of 2014, targeting the different 
components of the RCA system as well as data on its results nationwide."% The first 
FOIA request focused on the component of the RCA that evaluated whether a 
migrant was “subject to mandatory detention.”"& To understand how an automated 
system determined this critical and threshold question, we requested the business 
rules and protocols that produced a mandatory detention determination; materials 
discussing how the system would be updated to account for changes in law; and any 
training materials for officers and supervisors on how to apply the mandatory 
detention module and verify its results."' A second FOIA request addressed the 
20 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO (441213), ICE Alternatives to Detention: 
Questions Regarding the Risk Classification Assessment [hereinafter GAO Questions Regarding the 
RCA], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 33. 
21 FOIA requests on file with author Robert Koulish. See also Robert Koulish, Using Risk to 
Assess the Legal Violence of Mandatory Detention, LAWS, (July 5, 2016), at 8 n.29 (“ICE provided 505 
RCA Detailed Summaries to the authors through a non-adversarial FOIA process, in a series of 
four productions from September 2013 to June 2014. All were from ICE’s Baltimore Field Office 
(which spans the state of Maryland), in four batches labeled ‘March 2013’, ‘April 2013’, ‘May 
2013’, and ‘June 2013’ (ICE represented that the last batch was incomplete).”).
22 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Office of Enforcement and Removal 
Operations, RCA Scenario Playbook, Version 1.0 (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter RCA Scenario Playbook, 
Version 1.0], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 289.
23 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Lesson #939 (Oct. 17, 2013, 9:59:07 PM) 
[hereinafter ICE Lesson #939], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 133, 166.
24 RCA Scenario Playbook, Version 1.0, supra note 22, at 289. 
25 See infra app. at 853 for additional details on the content of the FOIA requests and the 
process required to extract our results. The electronic repository includes copies of all initial FOIA 
requests. See generally CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19. The FOIA requests were
submitted jointly by Kate Evans, Robert Koulish, Mark Noferi, Ben Casper Sanchez, and Linus 
Chan. The requestors then became joint plaintiffs in the subsequent FOIA litigation in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Minnesota.
26 See Freedom of Information Act Request from Katherine Evans, Teaching Fellow, Univ. 
of Minn., et al. to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Freedom of Info. Act Office, 4–5 (Oct. 15, 
2014) [hereinafter RCA Mandatory Detention FOIA Request].
27 See id. at 4.
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RCA’s components on flight risk and risk to public safety."( This request asked for 
all materials describing the assessment methodology for each component, including 
the scoring rubrics, as well as the method for combining the two separate 
assessments of risk into a single recommendation for detention or release.") We also 
requested materials on the use of the RCA to determine DHS bond amounts and 
protocols for modifying the RCA’s algorithms for flight risk and risk to public 
safety.#* We submitted a third request for information about how the RCA 
determined whether a migrant possessed a “special vulnerability.”#! We asked for 
any documents and other materials describing how special vulnerabilities were 
defined and assessed; how the presence of a special vulnerability interacted with the 
RCA’s other components; and the protocols, if any, for communication between 
ICE and the detention facility regarding the presence of a special vulnerability that 
was identified by either entity.#" Two final FOIA requests sought the detailed 
summaries the RCA produced for all ICE field offices since the system had been 
deployed nationwide## as well as a subset of detailed summaries for one of the field 
offices, which might allow us to compare a migrant’s history and case outcome with 
the RCA’s risk profile and detention recommendation.#$
DHS’s initial response to these requests was incoherent and nonsensical. DHS 
stated that it had “no records responsive” to our requests for information on the 
RCA risk algorithms and mandatory detention tool.#% In essence, DHS took the 
position that, despite publicizing the creation and function of the RCA in broad
terms to Congress and the press,#& there was not a single document that defined the 
28 See Freedom of Information Act Request from Katherine Evans, Teaching Fellow, Univ. 
of Minn., et al. to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Freedom of Info. Act Office, 4 (Oct. 15, 
2014) [hereinafter RCA Components FOIA Request].
29 See id. at 5–7.
30 See id. at 7.
31 See Freedom of Information Act Request from Katherine Evans, Teaching Fellow, Univ. 
of Minn., et al. to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Freedom of Info. Act Office, (Nov. 18, 
2014) [hereinafter RCA Special Vulnerabilities FOIA Request].
32 See id.
33 See Freedom of Information Act Request from Katherine Evans, Teaching Fellow, Univ. 
of Minn., et al. to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Freedom of Info. Act Office, (submitted 
on Oct. 15, 2014) [hereinafter RCA Detailed Summaries Nationally FOIA Request].
34 See Freedom of Information Act Request from Katherine Evans, Teaching Fellow, Univ. 
of Minn., et al. to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Freedom of Info. Act Office, (submitted 
on Oct. 21, 2014) [hereinafter RCA Detailed Summaries for St. Paul FOIA Request].
35 See First Amended Complaint at exs. 4, 13, Casper v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 
0:16-cv-00380-ADM-BRT (D. Minn. May 31, 2016) (hereinafter Casper FAC) (Final Response 
Letter re RCA Components FOIA Request from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, FOIA Officer to 
Kate Evans and Final Response Letter re RCA Mandatory Detention Request from R. Gowins & 
Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, FOIA Officers to Kate Evans (both dated Nov. 7, 2014)).
36 See Morton Testimony, supra note 15, at 34; PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 
14; Secretary Napolitano and ICE Assistant Secretary Morton Announce New Immigration Detention Reform 
Initiatives, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/news/
2009/10/06/new-immigration-detention-reform-initiatives-announced (announcing, among
other things, ICE’s plans to “develop an assessment tool to identify aliens suitable for ATD 
[alternatives to detention],” and to “develop a risk assessment and custody classification,” to 
“enable detainees to be placed in an appropriate facility”).
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RCA’s parameters or trained DHS personnel on how to implement the new 
nationwide tool.
Faced with these implausible responses, attorneys from Dorsey & Whitney 
LLP#' agreed to represent us on a pro bono basis. For the next two years, counsel for 
the authors perfected all administrative appeals, sued in federal district court, and 
negotiated a stipulated settlement requiring DHS to produce a wide array of 
documents and data. The parties signed the settlement agreement the day before 
the Trump Administration took office to avoid any delay or renegotiation that 
turnover in the U.S. Attorney’s office might cause.#( Despite having a final detailed 
settlement agreement, we had to challenge DHS’s compliance in producing the 
agreed-upon documents.#) Negotiations with the U.S. Attorney’s office that 
accompanied the federal litigation and the stipulated settlement resulted in the 
release of the following documents:
•! The business rules used to develop the first version of the RCA;
•! Flow charts outlining the process for running the RCA in the 
course of arresting individuals for immigration violations;
•! The Virtual University training module used to train front-line 
ICE officers in how to deploy the RCA;
•! Accompanying training manuals and reference guides for ICE 
officers;
•! Presentations to ICE leadership on the basic methodology of the 
RCA, the categories of migrants who must be evaluated by the 
RCA, and the timing of national deployment; 
•! Memoranda to ICE officers regarding major changes to the RCA 
algorithms;
•! Crime severity levels and changes to these levels over time;
•! The scoring values for all public safety risks and flight risks 
assessed and their changes over time;
•! Changes to all business rules over time;
•! Certification that DHS had produced all existing documents 
relating to (1) guidance given to supervisors on when they may 
override the RCA recommendations, (2) protocols on how ICE 
officers enter information on crimes that would indicate 
37 Attorneys Shannon L. Bjorklund, Colin Wicker, Michelle Grant, and Emily Mawer from 
Dorsey & Whitney LLP assisted with the authors’ administrative and judicial challenges.
38 See Stipulation of Settlement & Dismissal, Casper v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 0:16-
cv-00380-ADM-BRT (D. Minn. Jan. 19, 2017).
39 See, e.g., E-mail from Colin Wicker, Senior Att’y, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, to Ann Bildtsen, 
Assistant U.S. Att’y, U.S. Att’y’s Off. Dist. Minn. (Apr. 3, 2018, 09:55 CDT) (on file with authors); 
Letter from Colin Wicker, Senior Att’y, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, to Ann Bildtsen, Assistant U.S.
Att’y, U.S. Att’y’s Off. Dist. Minn. (December 19, 2017) (on file with authors); Letter from Colin 
Wicker, Senior Att’y, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, to Ann Bildtsen, Assistant U.S. Att’y, U.S. Att’y’s 
Off. Dist. Minn. (Aug. 14, 2017) (on file with authors). 
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migrants are subject to mandatory detention, and (3) training 
materials and protocols on communication between detention 
facilities and RCA users regarding a migrant’s special 
vulnerabilities;$*
•! Summary data on the outcomes of the RCA for 1.4 million 
individual assessments;
•! Detailed data on the application of all RCA factors as well as its 
detention recommendations and the final supervisor decisions 
for 2,500 individual assessments.
Notably, we requested documents describing the data validating the choice of 
risk factors and their relative weight along with the evidence used to support 
changes to the risk algorithms, but received no documents that illustrated the source 
of the RCA’s risk logic. 
The following Part describes how the RCA is used by officials engaged in 
immigration enforcement across the country and why its recommendations are 
often insulated from further review and therefore frequently conclusive on the 
question of detention.
II.  DEPLOYING THE RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT TO 
DETERMINE IMMIGRATION DETENTION
The RCA uses a malleable algorithm to automatically assign civil immigration 
detention. The nature of the rules that make up this algorithm—the factors assessed, 
the weight given to each, the thresholds for each risk level, the custody 
recommendation per risk level, and the scope of discretion allocated to ICE 
supervisors—have enormous consequences. Until now, the RCA’s program for 
recommending custody and its alterations have been buried in arcane business rules 
and spreadsheets. Here, we pull back the curtain to reveal DHS’s automated 
detention methodology. This Part explains the role of the RCA as well as the 
framework it uses to assess risk and allocate custody for tens of thousands of 
migrants every day. With an understanding of the algorithm and its manipulations 
as background, the Article then turns to its policy implications and legal significance.
A. The Significance and Scope of the RCA Recommendations.
The RCA has different implications for different types of immigration 
detention. Broadly speaking, immigration detention can be divided into two 
categories: mandatory and discretionary. Mandatory detention applies to individuals 
who are subject to expedited removal due to their recent entrance and location of 
apprehension; individuals with previous orders of removal, which are reinstated 
upon their re-entry to the United States; individuals with final removal orders who 
have not departed the United States in certain circumstances; and individuals with 
particular types of criminal convictions defined by Congress. All other migrants can 
40 See Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, FOIA Officer, to Colin Wicker & Shannon 
Bjorklund, Dorsey & Whitney LLP (May 25, 2018) [hereinafter Letter Concerning Casper Case]
(concerning Casper v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. case) (on file with the authors).
42513-lcb_24-3 S
heet N
o. 41 S
ide A
      08/03/2020   09:57:48
42513-lcb_24-3 Sheet No. 41 Side A      08/03/2020   09:57:48
C M
Y K
LCB_24_3_Art_2_Evans_&_Koulish.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/13/20 11:33 PM
2020] MANIPULATING RISK 801
be detained pending a final removal decision at the discretion of DHS and the 
Attorney General, but do not have to be.$!
For migrants who are not subject to mandatory detention, the initial RCA 
recommendation has a particular significance. These individuals receive an initial 
decision by DHS as to whether they will be held in custody, and if so, whether they 
will be granted a bond of any amount, the payment of which would permit them to 
leave detention. These decisions regarding custody and bond are based on the 
RCA’s recommendations, using the algorithm described below, and the subsequent 
decision by a supervisor. Migrants subject to discretionary detention, with or 
without a bond, can challenge DHS’s determinations in a “redetermination hearing” 
before an immigration judge.$" However, review of DHS’s custody determinations 
is not automatic.$#  
The burden is on the detainee to request a hearing before an immigration 
judge.$$ Many detainees do not have counsel to navigate this process, and therefore 
may not secure a custody or bond redetermination hearing at all.$% Even if one is 
able to secure a hearing, release is far from guaranteed. The most recent data shows 
that since 2001, immigration judges have denied bond in approximately 54% of all 
custody redetermination hearings.$& Success often depends, at least in part, on 
having counsel$' and in many cases, even with counsel, a hearing before an 
immigration judge is not likely to improve conditions for release. Scholars argue 
that bond hearings do not provide any meaningful review of the initial decision to 
detain, but rather serve only to review the bond amount set.$( The financial burden 
placed on detainees to pay bond is extremely high. The minimum bond amount 
possible is $1,500,$) an amount that many people in this country cannot afford.%*
The median bond amount after review in an immigration court is much greater at 
$8,000.%! Consequently, many individuals remain in detention solely for their 
41 See 8 USC § 1226(a); see also infra, notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
42 See Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration 
Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 187–88 (2016) (explaining custody review process).
43 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2012).
44 See id.
45 Eagly & Shafer, supra note 10, at 70.
46 Immigration Court Bond Hearings and Related Case Decisions, TRAC IMMIGR.,
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/bond/ (search “all” in both “Bond Hearing 
Immigration Court State” and “Nationality;” then search “Not Granted” in “Bond Hearing 
Outcome”) (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
47 Eagly & Shafer, supra note 10, at 70; Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond 
Hearings, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117, 143 (2016).
48 See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 42, at 188; see also Das, supra note 17, at 155–59 (“[M]any 
immigration judges constrain themselves even further by interpreting the law as prohibiting them 
from releasing noncitizens on any conditions other than bond.”).
49 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).
50 See Discretionary Detention by the Numbers, ACLU ANALYTICS & IMMIGRANTS’ RTS. PROJECT,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-
detention/discretionary-detention (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
51 Importance of Nationality in Immigration Court Bond Decisions, TRAC IMMIGR. (Feb, 12, 2019), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/545/.
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financial inability to pay.%" In light of these circumstances, the RCA’s initial 
recommendation often becomes the final word on a person’s detention and 
conditions for release.
The RCA is not only extremely consequential but also broad in scope. As of 
January 2013, the RCA guides the decisions on whether to detain or release between 
350,000 and 450,000 individuals every year.%# The system was first piloted in the 
Baltimore and Washington field office areas of responsibilities beginning July 
2012.%$ Lessons learned from the pilot phase in these offices then informed the 
rollout to the other field office areas.%% Between November 2012 and the end of 
January 2013, the RCA was implemented nationwide.%& By the end of this period, 
ICE officers and agents were required to complete an RCA for every adult 
committed to ICE custody with two narrow exceptions. The RCA was not required 
for migrants subject to mandatory detention who would likely depart or be removed
within five days, or for migrants benefiting from ICE’s decision to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion and not issue a charging document against the person.%'  
B. The Role of the RCA in the Apprehension and Detention Process
ICE Enforcement and Removal Officers (EROs) complete the RCA during 
the initial intake process.%( This initial intake process is critical because much of the 
RCA’s algorithm depends on the data collected before the RCA is even launched. 
For migrants arrested by an enforcement and removal officer, the ERO ensures that 
52 See NYU SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, ET AL., INSECURE COMMUNITIES,
DEVASTATED FAMILIES: NEW DATA ON IMMIGRANT DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PRACTICES 
IN NEW YORK CITY 11 (July 23, 2012).
53 See 2019 ICE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8; U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR
2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 11 (2017); U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 
2 (2015). 
54 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees Bi-National Roundtable on Alternatives to Detention: Buffalo, N.Y. & Fort Erie, 
Ontario (Sept. 25, 2012) [hereinafter UNHCR Roundtable], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES,
supra note 19, at 30. ICE divides its operations into 24 field office areas of responsibility (AOR). 
Each field office is designated by the largest city it encompasses. Enforcement and Removal Operations 
Field Offices, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/contact/ero.
55 UNHCR Roundtable, supra note 54, at 30.
56 Id.
57 Memorandum from Gary Mead, Executive Associate Director, Enforcement and 
Removal Operations (ERO), U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All ERO Employees 
(Aug. 15, 2012, 4:44 PM), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 1; Risk 
Classification Assessment (RCA) Module: Lessons Learned Phase 1–6 (Feb. 5, 2013) [hereinafter 
2012 Lessons Learned RCA Module], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 827; 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, RCA Overview: Field Operations Briefing 
[hereinafter 2013 RCA Overview], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 229 (with 
metrics as of February 2013).
58 U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Risk Classification Assessment (RCA) in EARM 5.3 
Quick Reference Guide (Aug. 2013) [hereinafter RCA Quick Reference Guide], in CONSOLIDATED 
FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 1740; COMBINED RCA VIRTUAL UNIVERSITY RELEASE, DUKE 
L. SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 180 (2012) [hereinafter RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING], 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3994/.
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the individual is identified in ICE’s database as a new encounter or linked to an 
existing record if the person has encountered ICE in the past.%) The officer must 
also ensure that all criminal history is captured in the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database and update 
this information accordingly.&* Finally, the officer identifies and enters the statutes 
and allegations under which the person is charged with removability.&! For 
individuals arrested by an external office—such as Border Patrol, the Office of Field 
Operations within Customs and Border Protection, Homeland Security 
Investigations, Criminal Alien Program officers in state and federal prisons, or state 
and local police officers designated to enforce the immigration laws through the 
287(g) program—much of the initial intake and charging process is completed by 
the external arresting officer. In this scenario, ICE EROs are responsible only for 
reviewing the charging and custody documents and updating the ICE and NCIC 
databases with any missing information when they book the person into an ICE 
holding cell.&" At the end of the intake process, a migrant’s biographic information, 
immigration history, criminal history, supervision history, immigration case status, 
and removal charges are captured in ICE’s various databases.&# Additionally, either 
59 Memorandum on Helpful Hints When Starting an RCA for Detain/Release Decision & 
Using the RCA Generally 2 (Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 RCA Helpful Hints], in
CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 819.
60 Id.; RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 58, at 1740; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 
58, at 180.
61 2012 RCA Helpful Hints, supra note 59, at 819; RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 58, at
1740; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 180.
62 RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 58, at 1740; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, 
at 180; see also Tim Gibney & Beth Mangum, Risk Classification Assessment Release 1.0 Business 
Requirements Version 1.8 (Aug. 19, 2011) [hereinafter RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements], in
CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 939 (describing the intake responsibilities of 
“External Apprehending Entities”). U.S. Border Patrol is the law enforcement arm of Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) that is responsible for monitoring the U.S. border between ports of 
entry. See Executive Assistant Commissioners’ Offices, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Nov. 19, 2019), 
https://www.cbp.gov/about/leadership-organization/executive-assistant-commissioners-
offices. The Office of Field Operations is the largest component of CBP and is responsible for
monitoring border security, trade, and travel into the United States at more than 300 ports of 
entry around the country and abroad. Id. Homeland Security Investigations is the investigative 
arm of the Department of Homeland Security, mainly devoted to combating criminal 
organizations illegally exploiting America’s travel, trade, financial and immigration systems. See 
Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, (Aug. 15, 2019), 
https://www.ice.gov/hsi. The Criminal Alien Program (CAP) within ICE provides “direction and 
support in the biometric and biographic identification, arrest, and removal of priority aliens who 
are incarcerated within federal, state, and local prisons and jails, as well as at large criminal aliens 
that have circumvented identification.” See Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T
(Jan 3, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program. Section 287(g) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act allows the Director of ICE to enter into agreements with state and local law 
enforcement agencies so as to permit designated officers to perform certain immigration law 
enforcement functions. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality 
Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.ice.gov/287g.
63 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Risk Classification Assessment: Briefing for 
Council 118, PowerPoint Presentation (June 16, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Briefing for Council 118], in
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an ICE ERO or an officer at an external agency has generated a charging document. 
This data is then used to auto-populate many of the factors evaluated in the RCA.&$
Once the intake process is complete, the ICE officer launches the RCA.&% The 
RCA combines the data gathered through intake with the migrant’s responses to 
structured interview questions and generates recommendations regarding detention 
or release, whether a bond will be set and if so the amount, the custody classification 
level if detained, and the supervision level if released.&& In total, the RCA uses 
hundreds of factors to produce these recommendations.
The next Part of the Article uses more than 1,700 pages of FOIA results 
encompassing business rules, training materials, internal memoranda and 
presentations, and scoring changes to describe the RCA’s methodology, its changes 
over time, as well as the impact of these changes on the likelihood of detention for 
broad categories of migrants. The Parts that follow then argue that manipulation of 
the RCA resulted in its failure to achieve its policy goals and created an automated 
system of unconstitutional detention. Accordingly, this Article focuses on the 
RCA’s design, its modifications, and its consequences for detention law and policy. 
The authors anticipate that future publications will describe the demographics of 
the detained population produced by the RCA, using the summary outcomes and 
detailed data also obtained through the FOIA litigation.
III.  THE RCA’S METHODOLOGY AND ITS MANIPULATIONS
This Section describes the algorithm used to determine and combine the 
various components that generate the RCA recommendations for custody or release 
and associated conditions. The scoring rubric and its alterations are described 
below. Before outlining the RCA’s method in detail, we provide an overview of the 
RCA’s components and their interactions to guide this discussion. We reconstructed 
the RCA algorithm from the Business Rules, memoranda and guides to changes in 
the RCA provided as part of the documents released, and the rules matrix released 
as an excel document outlining the logic-based rules and their changes over time 
along with the scores for each factor and their changes over time.
The first section of the RCA requires the ICE officer to identify any “special 
vulnerability” the migrant has through an interview and observations. Once the ICE 
officer finishes the special vulnerabilities assessment, the RCA next requires an 
evaluation of mandatory detention. This section is supposed to be entirely 
automatic, using the inputs from the various ICE databases that are updated during 
the intake process. After the special vulnerabilities and mandatory detention 
components are complete, the RCA evaluates the person’s risk to public safety using 
a scoring rubric that relies principally on static criminal history pulled from other 
databases, combined with a few additional inputs determined by the ICE officer. 
CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 781; see also Anil Kalhan, Immigration 
Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 31–35 (2014) (explaining various ICE tracking mechanisms).
64 GAO Questions Regarding the RCA, supra note 20, at 33; 2011 Briefing for Council 118, supra
note 63, at 781; RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 58, at 1756.
65 RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 58, at 1742–43; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 
58, at 180.
66 GAO Questions Regarding the RCA, supra note 20, at 33–34.
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Taken together, the RCA generates a public safety risk level of high/medium/low. 
The ICE officer then moves to the flight risk component, which is based largely on 
responses to interview questions the user must ask. The flight risk factors are scored 
and the RCA generates a flight risk level of high/medium/low. Based on the 
combination of risk levels, the RCA generated one of four recommendations: 
release, supervisor to determine, detain-eligible for bond, or detain in the custody 
of DHS (i.e., no bond set). 
For those migrants that received a recommendation of detain-eligible for bond, 
the RCA also recommends a bond amount. For individuals receiving a detention 
recommendation, the RCA recommends a custody classification level of low, 
low/medium, medium/high, or high. For individuals receiving a release 
recommendation, the RCA recommends release without technology, with 
technology, or leaves that condition for the supervisor to determine. Finally, the 
ICE officer must indicate if he or she agrees with the RCA recommendations and 
provide reasons for any disagreement. Then an ICE supervisor must review the 
RCA recommendation and the ICE officer’s comments and make a final decision 
with respect to the person’s custody and any conditions for detention or release.
From the outset, DHS officials acknowledged that the RCA does not take into 
account certain factors that should be considered when deciding whether to detain 
someone. Specifically, the RCA does not account for threats to national security, 
eligibility for relief, eligibility for a U or T visa, length of lawful status in the U.S., 
entry as a minor, lack of ties to the home country, conditions in the home country, 
or nationality that renders removal unlikely.&'
The RCA uses a highly configurable assessment rubric that was modified in 
significant ways during our study period. DHS officials altered the risk levels 
periodically so that factors that once generated a medium public safety risk later 
generated a high public safety risk. The RCA detain/release logic was also modified 
so that the combination of two medium risk levels, which once resulted in a 
supervisor to determine recommendation, later led to a detain (no bond) 
recommendation.&( The different algorithms can be divided into three separate time 
periods: the first version was in effect from October 2012 to December 2013; the
second scoring system spanned January 2014 to January 2015; and the third version 
was implemented in February 2015 and remained in place through the end of the 
study period in October 2015.&) With each change, RCA recommendations 
67 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Risk Classification Assessment: Training 
SME & Key User Training (May 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Key User Training], in CONSOLIDATED 
FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 1101, 1136; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 11.
68 RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 11.
69 FOIA results show 19 different versions in all. Some of these versions related to the pilot 
RCA from July–September 2012. The first version was in effect from July 2012 through mid-
January 2014. New versions were also implemented on January 11, 2014, January 12, 2014, and 
January 13, 2014. We have consolidated these changes and examined the scoring system as it 
existed from January 13, 2014 until the next major set of changes in February 2015. Though the 
FOIA responses show a few occasional changes during each time period, the major changes to 
the algorithm occur at three points in time: October 2012, January 2014, and February 2015. For 
ease of analysis, we consolidate all changes within these time periods and describe the algorithm 
as a whole.
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increasingly reflected the Obama Administration’s political enforcement priorities, 
rather than indicia of flight risk or risks to public safety. Indeed, the changes in 
February 2015 nullified nearly all flight risk factors and replaced them with date of 
entry so that immigration detention simply mirrored the administration’s 
enforcement policy for recent entrants. The explanations for these changes, to the 
extent they exist, are discussed in Part IV. Here, we focus on the algorithmic and 
scoring changes that alter the resulting risk levels, notwithstanding the fact that 
underlying characteristics generating these heightened assessments remain constant.
A. RCA’s Initial Rubric: July 2012–January 2014 (Period 1)
This Section describes the baseline scoring system initially deployed by the 
RCA to arrive at detention recommendations. We then review the major changes 
that progressively converted the RCA into a tool that tied detention to enforcement 
priority level and abandoned most measures of risk.
Special Vulnerabilities (Period 1)
Screening for special vulnerabilities is the first component of the RCA. This 
module requires ICE officers to identify individuals who have a serious physical 
illness; a serious mental illness; a disability; are elderly, pregnant, nursing; have sole 
caregiving responsibility; face risks based on sexual orientation or gender identity; 
are victims of persecution or torture, sexual abuse, a violent crime, or human 
trafficking. Users can also select “other” and provide comments.'* The list of 
vulnerabilities can be modified to adapt to new and different concerns,'! but no 
changes were made to this list during the Obama Administration. Among this list 
of 11 specified vulnerabilities, seven were identified as “priorities”: serious physical 
illness, serious mental illness, disability, elderly, pregnant, nursing, and primary 
caretaker.'"
To assess serious physical illness, officers are prompted to review any medical 
records and prescription medications in the person’s possession and ask whether 
the individual has been hospitalized in the past six months, is taking prescription 
medication, requires daily medical care, or is terminally ill.'# The quick reference 
guide for special vulnerabilities identifies diabetes, seizures, HIV/AIDS, heart 
problems, cancer, and epilepsy as examples.'$ The RCA Playbook, created to train 
officers using different scenarios, includes an example of someone identified as 
70 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 872. 
71 Id. at 871.
72 2013 RCA Overview, supra note 57, at 234.
73 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Office of Enforcement and Removal 
Operations, Risk Classification Assessment (RCA) Quick Reference Guide, Version 3.0 (March 
2013) [hereinafter RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 
19, at 1339. 
74 Office of Enforcement Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide (n.d.) [hereinafter Special Vulnerabilities Quick 
Reference Guide], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 1491.
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having a “serious physical illness” based on hospitalization for diabetes, medication 
for diabetes and blood pressure, and reported kidney problems.'%
Yet, this example of a special vulnerability—the only one in the RCA training 
materials—also comes with a caveat that undermines the screening tool’s 
fundamental purpose. The training guide states that the presence of a special 
vulnerability based on these factors was agreed upon by a panel of RCA developers 
and ICE officials, “however, they do not represent the required decisions that must 
be reached when using the system.” Instead, the circumstances of each case “and 
each field office will influence” the decision-making process.'& While the officer 
recommends release in the training materials due to the special vulnerability 
identified, this outcome is not required for similar cases.''
For serious mental illness, the pop-up window in the RCA directs officers to 
ask if the individual has been hospitalized or treated for a mental illness or is taking 
medications for a mental illness.'( They are supposed to observe whether the person 
appears disoriented, is unaware of their surroundings, is unable to focus on 
instructions, is hearing voices, or is expressing irrational or violent thoughts toward 
themselves or others.') The quick reference guide adds rambling nonsensical speech 
or loud rapid speech and severe withdrawal to the list of observations.(*  
To assess disability, officers are to ask if the person requires assistance in daily 
living activities such as bathing, eating, toileting, and dressing and should observe 
whether the person uses a wheelchair, cane, crutches, walker or has a prosthesis and 
if the person is blind, deaf, mute, an amputee or has other disabilities.(! For the 
elderly vulnerability, officers are instructed to observe whether the person is 
“infirm” due to age, not whether the person is over 65 years old.("
Women should be asked if they are pregnant or have reason to believe they are 
pregnant, as well as whether they are nursing an infant or toddler.(# When 
identifying primary caretaking responsibility, officers are instructed to ask if the 
individual arrested is primarily responsible for a child or elderly person and note the 
circumstances of the dependent including age, nature of infirmity, and who is
currently caring for that person.($ The quick reference guide adds whether others 
are financially dependent on them and instructs officers to ask if they fear for their 
children’s safety if they are cared for by someone else.(%  
Officers should ask if the person arrested fears harm in detention due to his or 
her sexual orientation or gender identity.(& The quick reference guide notes that 
75 RCA Scenario Playbook, Version 1.0, supra note 22, at 283, 308. 
76 Id. at 285.
77 Id. at 321.
78 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1366.
79 Id.
80 Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide, supra note 74, at 1491.
81 Id.
82 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1339.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide, supra note 74, at 1492.
86 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1339.
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individuals may not identify themselves as LGBTI to ICE agents and instructs 
officers to ask if the person has experienced abuse or harassment, fears being placed 
in a particular gender wing within a facility, or has recently received hormone 
therapy.('  
Officers must also assess whether the individual is the victim of harm. They 
are instructed to ask if the person is a victim of persecution or torture and to assess 
the country of origin, documentation of the claim, and evidence of trauma.(( They 
must also provide the number for the United Nations Refugee Agency to those who 
answer affirmatively.() The RCA pop-up windows provide no questions to ask to 
assess persecution. If the officer refers to the quick reference guide, it instructs 
officers to ask if the person has been harmed or tortured in their home country or 
fears such harm.)* Agents must also ask if the person is a victim of sexual abuse or 
violent crime and review evidence substantiating the claim. If the answer is yes, 
officers must provide the number for the National Domestic Violence Hotline, 
which can assess eligibility for U visas.)!
Finally, officers assess human trafficking by asking whether since entering the 
U.S. the person has been intimidated, deceived, obligated, or forced to engage in 
prostitution or labor against the person’s will.)" If the answer is yes, the officer 
should contact Homeland Security Investigations and provide basic details for 
further investigation. The special vulnerabilities quick reference guide provides 
additional sources of assessment: whether the person was working in a situation 
they could not escape; was paid for their labor; was free to live on their own or 
forced to live where the employer designated; lacked possession of their documents; 
displayed unreasonable fear, anxiety, or submissiveness; displayed signs of physical 
or sexual abuse, physical restraint or malnourishment, or untreated illness.)#  
For the first two years of implementation, if a special vulnerability was 
identified, the RCA did not recommend detention unless the person was subject to 
mandatory detention based on the removal charges or had departed the country 
after receiving a final removal order and then re-entered the U.S.)$ Migrants with a 
special vulnerability that the RCA determined were a low flight risk and a low risk 
to public safety were recommended for release.)% The remaining people in this 
group received an RCA recommendation that the “supervisor . . . determine” 
whether to detain or release the person regardless of their risk profile.)& The 
recommendation of “supervisor to determine” obviated the need for the supervisor 
87 Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide, supra note 74, at 1492.
88 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1339.
89 Id.
90 Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide, supra note 74, at 1492.
91 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1339.
92 Id.
93 Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide, supra note 74, at 1492.
94 See ATP RULES MATRIX V. 3, DUKE L. SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (n.d.) [hereinafter RCA
RULES AND SCORING], https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3994/ (Logic 
Based Rules).
95 Id.
96 Id. 
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to override an RCA recommendation of detain or release and provide a justification 
for the override, thus allowing supervisors to wield their discretion more freely. For 
vulnerable individuals subject to mandatory detention, officers were told to consult 
their office of chief counsel for guidance, but the RCA generated a detain 
recommendation nonetheless.)'
Risk to Public Safety (Period 1)
While the special vulnerabilities screening functions as an on/off switch in the 
RCA algorithm, the public safety component involves a complex and multi-layered 
scoring system. The goal of the RCA was to better assess public safety risk and 
assign custody levels by aligning the scoring methodology to criminological 
classification literature.)( The RCA, therefore, measures patterns of violence for 
severity and frequency and discounts criminal history the further back in time it 
occurred.)) It measures immigrants as it would people accused of crimes, in effect, 
criminalizing immigrants. It relies on automatic inputs from ICE’s other databases
concerning an individual’s identity and criminal history as well as data gathered by 
the officer through the RCA interview process.!**
The Public Safety Risk Assessment section starts with an evaluation of the 
charges and/or convictions—if any—that are the reason for the encounter with 
ICE. Notably, the RCA scores all charges and convictions including those that are 
pending or dropped; but it does not score charges that are dismissed.!*! The 
charge’s severity is evaluated using a mapping table that lists NCIC codes and 
offense descriptions with the corresponding severity level assigned in the RCA.!*"
The encounter charge or conviction is then scored based on its severity.!*# In the 
case of multiple charges, users are instructed to use the one that generates the 
highest score.!*$ Once a charge or conviction has been utilized in the Public Safety 
Risk score calculation, it cannot be used again.!*%
97 2012 Key User Training, supra note 67, at 1120.
98 Memorandum to Phyllis Coven, Acting Dir., Office of Detention Policy & Planning on 
the Simulation of Custody Levels Under the Current Detention Standard and the Proposed 
Changes to Intake Processing (Nov. 18, 2010) in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 
19, at 506–507.
99 Id.
100 2012 RCA Helpful Hints, supra note 59, at 819.
101 Id.; U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Office of Enforcement & Removal 
Operations, Risk Classification Assessment (RCA) Frequently Asked Questions, Version 1 
(revised July 2012) [hereinafter 2012 FAQ], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, 
at 1325, 1328. The RCA documents do not provide a description of the difference between 
dropped and dismissed charges or what documents are used to distinguish between the two 
dispositions.
102 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Crime Codes).
103 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 873, 968–69. RCA RULES AND 
SCORING, supra note 94 (Point Based Scoring Rules).
104 Id.
105 Id.
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Severity Score
Low 2 
Moderate 4 
High 6 
Highest 7 
During Period 1, low severity crimes included: possession of fraudulent 
immigration documents, driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, all traffic 
offenses other than hit-and-run or transporting dangerous materials, general 
property crimes, domestic violence, prostitution, and drug possession. Moderate 
severity crimes included: illegal entry, illegal re-entry, drug trafficking, assault, 
embezzlement and stolen property crimes, petty larceny, and sex crimes involving 
minors. High severity offenses included crimes such as military desertion, negligent 
manslaughter, sexual assault, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, drug smuggling, 
and arson. Classified at the highest severity level were intentional homicide, treason 
and espionage, kidnapping, rape, and state offenses for crimes labeled terroristic 
threats, which can range from offensive touching to assault causing serious injury.!*&
Both the severity level and the score assigned to the severity level could be 
changed. Changes to both fields were made in January 2014 and again in February 
2015.
Additional points are assigned for charges or convictions for offenses that are 
identified as “Special Public Safety Factors.”!*' During Periods 1 and 2, these 
offenses were limited to domestic violence (DV) and driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs (DUI).!*( If the charge prompting the encounter with ICE is a 
special public safety factor, the crime is given a score of seven regardless of its 
severity rating. Any remaining charges or convictions for special public safety factors are 
then added to the public safety score.!*) One special public safety factor not yet 
scored generates seven points; two or more special public safety factors that have 
not yet been scored generate 11 more points.!!* If an individual has a restraining 
order but no associated criminal charge, the restraining order is not assessed as part 
of the public safety section but officers are instructed to note this in connection 
with the RCA detain/release decision for supervisors to consider.!!!
Using any remaining criminal history not yet scored, the most severe conviction 
is then assessed based on its severity level and length of decay.!!" Here, convictions 
(not charges) are required.!!# The conviction generating the highest score is then 
added as follows:!!$
106 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Crime Codes).
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 875.
110 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Point Based Scoring Rules).
111 2012 FAQ, supra note 101, at 1328.
112 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 875.
113 Id. at 973.
114 Id. at 975; RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Point Based Scoring Rules).
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Age
Severity < 5 years 5–10 years 10–15 years > 15 years
Low 2 1 0 0 
Moderate 4 3 2 1 
High 6 6 5 5 
Highest 7 6 5 5 
If, after the first three steps, a migrant had other convictions that had not been 
tallied, they are then scored based on quantity and felony or misdemeanor status.!!%
The RCA considers an offense to be a felony if the sentence was more than 365 
days and a misdemeanor if the sentence was 365 days or less.!!& The greatest number 
of points possible based on either the number of felony convictions or 
misdemeanor convictions (but not both) is added to the total score.!!'
  
The final step for the automated component based on criminal history is to
score any residual charges that have not yet generated points under the prior rules. 
Remaining charges are assessed for whether they are categorized as violent crimes. 
Each NCIC crime code is mapped to a violence determination in the RCA 
system.!!( Only charges for violent crimes result in additional points and only if 
there are at least two charges for violent crimes that have not yet been scored, using 
the date of the most recent charge.!!) Domestic Violence is characterized as a 
special public safety factor and a violent crime. The RCA prioritizes scoring DUI 
115 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 976.
116 See RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Logic Based Scoring Rules); RCA Quick 
Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1375. Two points are added for one remaining felony 
conviction; four points are added for two or more remaining felony convictions (regardless of 
age). RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 979. For misdemeanor convictions, 
one or two convictions equals one additional point; three or four convictions equals two more 
points; and five or more misdemeanor convictions adds four points. Id.
117 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 979.
118 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Crime Codes).
119 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 982–83.
Number of unscored convictions 
(regardless of age)
Score
1-2 remaining misdemeanors 1 
1 remaining felony, or
3-4 remaining misdemeanors
2 
2 or more remaining felonies, or
5 or more remaining misdemeanors
4 
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charges for the special public safety factor calculation over DV charges when both 
are present so that DV charges can be added through this residual scoring factor.!"*
Age of Most Recent Charge
>15 years 10–15 years 5–10 years <5 years
2 or more 
Violent Charges
1 2 3 5 
  
The Public Safety component then requires a series of manual entries related 
to warrants, prior supervision history, and security threat group. Users must 
determine if any open warrant exists and then categorize it as violent or non-
violent.!"! If the warrants are for violent crimes, regardless of age or quantity, 5 
points are added to the total public safety risk score. Agents are instructed to refer 
to the federal definition of a crime of violence to answer this question by 
determining whether the offense “has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” or is a 
felony that “by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against the 
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense.”!"" In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the second definition 
of violent crime was unconstitutionally vague.!"# It is not clear whether ICE officers 
have been instructed to assess the violent nature of open warrants differently in light 
of this decision.
Users must also gather information concerning any prior supervision violations 
with the following scores. Only the highest point value from this history is used.!"$
Supervision History Score
Attempted escape from a Non-Secure 
Facility
4 (reduced to 3 on 11/20/12)
Prior Revocation of criminal 
supervised release
4 (reduced to 3 on 11/20/12)
Violations of conditions of 
supervision
4 (reduced to 3 on 11/20/12)
Escape or attempted escape from a 
secure facility
7 
120 Id. at 970.
121 Id. at 876.
122 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1377. 
123 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018).
124 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 877.
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Finally, the individual is assessed for security threat group (STG) or gang 
affiliation. Initially, seven points were added if the officer determined that the 
migrant is affiliated with a gang; the scoring was later modified in Periods 2 and 3.!"%
A member of an STG is defined as “any individual, or group of individuals, who 
through association, ideology, common name, identifying symbol(s), or whose 
activities and/or conduct (both inside and outside custodial environments) pose a 
threat to the safety of the community, and the security of the ICE staff, ICE 
facilities, and/or those in ICE custody.”!"&
Tallying the total public safety risk score provides the raw material for the 
critical determination of the public safety risk level. It is the risk level that drives the 
detention recommendation. During Period 1, the public safety scores were mapped 
to risk levels as follows:
Public Safety Risk Levels
Low 0–4 
Medium 5–11
High 12–53
Based on the public safety algorithm in place from October 2012 through 
December 2013, an arrest for a DUI or domestic violence offense, regardless of 
conviction, rendered the person a medium public safety risk. So too did any 
suspected gang affiliation. Because illegal entry and illegal re-entry are both 
considered a moderate offense, a conviction for either of these within the past five 
years, or a charge for either resulting in the ICE encounter plus a traffic offense, 
also generated a medium public safety risk level. More than two traffic offenses in 
the last five years made the person a medium public safety risk.
Risk of Flight (Period 1)
The public safety risk level was combined with the flight risk assessment to 
generate an overall custody recommendation. Unlike the public safety component 
of the RCA, which is largely automated, using data from other ICE sources, nearly 
all risk of flight information must be gathered by the ICE officer. The scoring here
includes positive numbers to account for community ties as well as negative 
numbers to account for indicia of flight. 
The public safety component begins by scoring any immigration violation 
history using records from an internal database on the individual’s encounter 
history.!"' This first scoring factor evaluates the number of voluntary returns and 
voluntary departures the person has received. !"(  
125 Id. at 987. RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Point Based Scoring Rules).
126 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1377. 
127 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 880.
128 Id. at 990. The RCA Quick Reference Guide from March 2013 indicates that the higher 
score was shifted to two or more voluntary returns, but this change is not reflected in the ATP 
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Encounter History Score
1–2 Voluntary Returns or Departures 2 
3 or more Voluntary Returns or Departures 5 
The RCA automatically pulls information on case status, immigration violation 
history, and substance abuse factors using ICE databases, which the officer is 
required to review and update.!") The ICE officer next looks for a history of 
absconding and other supervision violations.!#* These factors are thus assessed and
scored in both the public safety and flight risk components. The end-user must also 
assess substance abuse and determine whether the migrant has a documented 
history of drug use or is a current drug user. In the 2013 training materials, this 
factor includes alcohol use and agents are told to look at an individual’s history of 
DUI charges.!#! Consequently, DUI offenses will result in increased scores in both 
the public safety and risk of flight components. The individual’s case status also 
affects their flight risk level.!#" Other general flight risk factors concern 
identification documents.!##  
General Flight Risk Factors Score
Previously fled or avoided removal after a final order 1 
Revocation of supervision in prior immigration case 1 
Violation of conditions of supervision in a prior 
immigration case
1 
Bond breach in an immigration or criminal case  1 
Walk-away from a non-secure facility or alternatives to 
detention program
 1 
History of drug use  1 
Current drug user  2 
Final removal order pending appeal -1 
Final order with no appeal pending  5 
In immigration proceedings  0 
Valid government identification -1 
False identification document +1 per unique false 
name up to +2 total
Rule Matrix report on all scoring and factor changes. RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, 
at 1343.
129 2012 RCA Helpful Hints, supra note 59, at 819.
130 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 991; RCA RULES AND SCORING,
supra note 94 (Point Based Scoring Rules). 
131 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1343; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 
58, at 160 (Risk of Flight: Substance Abuse).
132 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 885.
133 Id. at 886.
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2020] MANIPULATING RISK 815
An individual’s community ties are then reviewed with the following scores 
attached during this initial period of the RCA.!#$ Partners who meet the 
requirements of a common law marriage or civil union are supposed to count as 
spouses for this section.!#%
Community Ties Score
Individual lives with immediate family members -1 
Individual has lived at address for six months or 
more
-1 
Individual has a stable address but has lived there 
for less than six months
0 
Individual has no stable address +2
Benefit application is pending with USCIS -2 
Service in the US Armed Forces by the migrant 
or spouse
-2 
Individual has a US citizen spouse or child -2 
If no US citizen spouse or child, then migrant has 
spouse or child or other family members in the 
local community
-1 
If no US citizen spouse or child then whether the 
migrant has family in the US but not in the local 
community
0 
Individual is enrolled in school or a training 
program
-1 
Individual has work authorization -1 
Individual owns property or considerable assets 
in the community
-1 
Individual has legal representation -1 
No established family or community support +2
The scores were then assigned to a risk level as follows:
Flight Risk
Low None to -5 
Medium -4 to +1
High +2 to none
The only high-scoring factors in the flight risk rubric during this time were 
three or more voluntary returns and having a final order that was not under 
appeal—each worth five points and generating a high flight risk level in the absence 
134 Id. at 883, 931–32.
135 2012 FAQ, supra note 101, at 1329.
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of other significant mitigating factors. Low flight risk scores were quite difficult to 
achieve though, as they required multiple community ties to arrive at a -5. 
Combining the RCA Factors to Arrive at a Detain/Release Recommendation (Period 1)
The RCA combines the results of the special vulnerability, mandatory 
detention, public safety, and flight risk assessments to generate one of four 
recommendations. First, “detain in the Custody of this Service,” which meant that 
no bond was set by ICE and thus any terms of release required a favorable decision 
from an immigration judge. Second was “detain, bond eligible,” meaning that ICE 
set a bond that could be paid immediately to allow for release or could be reviewed 
by an immigration judge to potentially lower the bond set. Third was “supervisor to 
determine—detain or release on community supervision” so that the RCA made no 
recommendation with respect to detention or bond. The fourth option was “release 
on community supervision,” which allowed the individual to leave custody under 
varying levels of supervision by ICE, but did not require paying a bond.!!"
For the group the RCA recommends Detain Eligible for Bond, the RCA also 
calculates a bond recommendation by multiplying the public safety score by $1000 
and the flight risk score by $1000 (which could be a negative number) and adding 
the two together.#!$ RCA administrators made clear, however, that the bond 
methodology was not intended to replace local practice and thus could be 
overridden by the local supervisor.#!%
During Period 1, only people who had mandatory detention removal charges 
or had a prior removal order and reentered the U.S. received the recommendation 
of detain in the custody of the service (i.e., without bond). The former category of 
migrants is statutorily subject to mandatory detention before any final determination 
of removal is made;#!& the latter category are subject to a process called 
reinstatement and detained under a different statute.#'( For all other migrants, the 
RCA recommendations followed this table.#'#
136 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 888.
137 Id. at 892; RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
138 2012 FAQ, supra note 101, at 1326.
139 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The removal charges that make an alien subject to mandatory 
detention are outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(D). They range from serious crimes, such as 
participation in terrorist activity or espionage, to a host of minor offenses, including violations of 
any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled 
substance; being a drug abuser or addict; conviction of a crime of “moral turpitude” with a 
sentence of longer than one year; a firearms offense; and certain immigration fraud offenses, such 
as making a false statement on an application or using a false permit.
140 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(3) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(f) (2019).
141 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 892; RCA RULES AND SCORING,
supra note 94 (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
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2020] MANIPULATING RISK 817
Because a release recommendation was limited to individuals with both low 
public safety and low flight risk scores, release was recommended only for 
individuals with criminal history limited to few low severity offenses and significant 
community ties. A conviction for illegal entry plus a traffic offense put a release 
recommendation out of reach. The large swath of moderate risk scores generated a 
recommendation leaving the detain/release determination to the ICE supervisor in 
the first instance.
Mandatory Detention (Period 1)
The mandatory detention assessment is completed after the special 
vulnerabilities screening but the release/detain recommendations are dependent on 
the public safety and flight risk scores for certain groups of migrants, and so we 
explain the mandatory detention algorithm here. The mandatory detention 
assessment is supposed to be entirely automatic based on the data entered at the 
time of the immigration arrest and the links to ICE’s other databases regarding 
immigration history, case processing type, and removal charges.!"# Except for those 
individuals subject to expedited removal, a person’s flight risk and risk to public 
safety were assessed regardless of whether he was designated as mandatorily 
detained.
The RCA will designate a migrant as subject to mandatory detention based on 
whether the person has a final order of removal and the type of removal charges 
lodged. If the person has a final order of removal, the evaluation proceeds down 
one path. If not, the RCA evaluates whether the charges in the Notice to Appear 
trigger mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)!"$ and recommends that the 
142 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0 , supra note 73, at 1339.
143 Id. at 1340; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 60; U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations, RCA Scenario Playbook, Version 
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818 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24.3
migrant be detained without bond accordingly.#'' A review of the removal 
allegations is performed only if there is no final order of removal.#')
If the person has a final order of removal, the RCA evaluates whether or not 
it has been executed, meaning the person has left the U.S. after receiving a final 
order. For those people with final executed orders of removal, the RCA 
recommended detention without bond during Period 1.#'"
If the migrant was subject to a final order but had not departed the United 
States—so that the order was not executed—the RCA collected information on 
whether the order was less than 90 days old, and for those people with orders older 
than 90 days, whether removal was likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.#'$
For those final orders that are less than 90 days old, an accompanying draft 
instructions document provides that this group could be released if they were not 
inadmissible or deportable on criminal or terrorism-related grounds.#'% For those 
who were found inadmissible or deportable on these grounds, officers could 
nonetheless release them within 90 days of the order if the person had been granted 
withholding of removal or deferral of removal under the Convention Against 
Torture and DHS was not pursuing removal to a third country likely to accept the 
person.#'&
For those final orders more than 90 days old, the RCA system pulls in data 
from the case status database regarding the reason the individual was not previously 
removed so that the officer can review whether the reasons the person was not 
previously removed remain.#)( The list includes: citizenship/nationality not 
determined, country conditions, deferred action, expressed fear of return, medical 
hold, not in ICE custody, per Office of Chief Counsel, per ICE headquarters, per 
DOJ Office of Immigration Litigation, removal unlikely in the foreseeable future, 
stay in federal court, stay from ICE field office, stay from immigration court, unable 
to obtain travel document due to migrant’s lack of cooperation, unable to obtain a 
travel document due to country refusal, and other.#)# If the case status indicates a 
category such as a country’s refusal to issue a travel document, then the mandatory 
detention section of the RCA showed that the person was not likely to be removed 
in the reasonably foreseeable future. If the case status did not include a reason 
1.1 (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter 2012 RCA Scenario Playbook], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES,
supra note 19, at 282. 
144 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 939.
145 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1339; RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra 
note 94 (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
146 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 939; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra
note 58, at 60.
147 RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 58, at 1745, 1776–78.
148 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, RCA Paper-based Implementation, Risk 
Classification Assessment Worksheet Instructions and Procedures (revised Aug. 23, 2011) 
[hereinafter RCA Worksheet Instructions], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at
1659.
149 Id.
150 See ICE Lesson #939, supra note 23; RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 
890.
151 CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 890–91, 1745–46, 1777–78.
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2020] MANIPULATING RISK 819
prohibiting removal, the RCA showed that removal was likely in the reasonably 
foreseeable future.#)*
The RCA Playbook provides an example of someone initially detained based 
on re-entry after an executed removal order whose detention was reassessed after 
90 days with the determination that removal was unlikely because of a change in 
conditions in the home country.#)! As a result, the officer initiated a reassessment 
and indicated his disagreement with the detention decision, noting the change in 
comments. The supervisor then changed the detain/release decision to release on 
community supervision.#)'  
Despite collecting information regarding the actual likelihood of removal, the 
detain/release recommendation for anyone with an unexecuted removal order is 
based only on the presence of special vulnerabilities and the public safety and flight 
risk levels as follows:#))  
Public Safety
Fl
ig
ht
 R
isk
Low Medium High
Low Release Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain
Medium Supervisor to 
Determine
Supervisor to 
determine 
Detain
High Detain Detain Detain
If there is no final order, the mandatory detention module uses the removal 
allegations entered at the time of the encounter to auto-populate the RCA. This 
assessment is based on the immigration charges entered, not the criminal 
convictions listed.#)" This means that even if an immigrant has been convicted of 
an offense triggering mandatory detention, if the individual is not charged as 
removable for that offense, the RCA will not designate them as subject to 
mandatory detention.#)$ Officers must verify that the individual’s arrest record is 
complete in its other enforcement databases for this feature in the RCA to 
function.#)% For those individuals with mandatory detention charges, the 
recommendation is detain in the custody of this service and the public safety risk 
score is used only to generate a custody classification recommendation.#)& Having a 
special vulnerability does not alter the detention recommendation. Therefore, a 
supervisor would have to override the detain recommendation and explain the basis 
152 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1371–72. 
153 2012 RCA Scenario Playbook, supra note 143, at 351. 
154 Id. at 355.
155 RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 58–60 (Mandatory Detention section); RCA
RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
156 2012 RCA Scenario Playbook, supra note 143, at 361.
157 Id.
158 2012 RCA Helpful Hints, supra note 59, at 819; RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra 
note 62, at 889.
159 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 889.
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820 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24.3
for that override in order to release someone with a special vulnerability from 
detention if their removal charges fell under the mandatory detention statute.#"(  
Significantly, the RCA training materials acknowledge that some removal 
grounds that trigger mandatory detention do not represent a high risk to public 
safety. The national training course on the RCA includes an example of a person 
who is designated as mandatorily detained based on statutes and regulations for a 
drug possession conviction but is determined to represent a low risk to public safety 
and thus generates a low custody classification.#"#
If mandatory detention will be required after a final order is approved under 
the Administrative Removal process, the individual is not designated as mandatorily 
detained in the RCA unless a mandatory detention charge is entered through the 
separate arrest record.#"* If an individual is, or will be, subject to an administrative 
removal order but is not appearing as mandatorily detained, officers are instructed 
that they can highlight the issue so that supervisors override the RCA
recommendation and choose detain in the custody of the service.#"!
Initially, individuals who were processed through expedited removal#"' were 
not identified as mandatorily detained and received an RCA recommendation based 
on their flight risk and public safety score. Between February 2013 and August 2013, 
DHS changed this aspect of the RCA algorithm so that when a person’s case 
processing disposition was designated as expedited removal, the RCA would 
automatically recommend detention without bond.#") Officers could still run the 
full RCA to determine the custody classification level, but were not required to.#""
Supervisory Review (Period 1)
All of the RCA recommendations are generated automatically based on inputs 
for the various factors and the scores and rules assigned to those factors. An ICE 
officer may need to elicit information to complete the RCA but its 
recommendations flow automatically from that data. Once the RCA 
recommendation process is complete, the system requires human oversight. 
First, the ICE officer who performs the RCA can indicate whether they agree 
with all of the recommendations and add explanatory comments for a supervisor to 
consider. A supervisor must then decide whether to accept or override the RCA 
recommendation.#"$ The supervisor review screen shows the person’s name, 
160 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94. 
161 RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 58–60. 
162 2012 RCA Helpful Hints, supra note 59, at 819.
163 Id.
164 Expedited removal is a process by which immigration officers can order a noncitizen 
removed without a hearing or review by an immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) 
(2012). Expedited removal applies to any individual seeking entry at the border who is 
inadmissible for making misrepresentations or lacking valid entry documents, unless the individual 
indicates that they plan to apply for asylum. Id. An individual apprehended anywhere else is subject 
to expedited removal if they have not been admitted or paroled and cannot show that they have 
been continuously present in the U.S. for two years. Id.
165 2013 RCA Overview, supra note 57, at 236.
166 RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 58, at 1744.
167 Id. at 1756.
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2020] MANIPULATING RISK 821
country of birth, citizenship, age, case status, and the results of each RCA 
component: special vulnerability status, mandatory detention determination, public 
safety risk level, flight risk level, detain/release recommendation and bond 
recommendation, if any.#&( The review page also includes alert icons if the person 
is subject to a final order of removal or has a criminal history.#&) Though the 
supervisor may review the individual factors that generate the RCA detain/release 
recommendation, they are not required to.#'* If they disagree with the 
recommendation, an explanation is required in a “comments/justification” field.#'#
After the supervisor makes a final decision regarding custody and conditions, the 
ICE officer prints out an RCA detailed summary for the individual’s immigration 
file and issues a custody determination.#'"  
B. The RCA Rubric: January 2014–February 2015 (Period 2)
Changes to the Public Safety Rubric in Period 2  
Although the general trend in the RCA was to create a risk tool that is 
increasingly stringent, severity levels were ratcheted up and down from period 1 to 
period 2. Offenses reduced from moderate to low severity included: the 
immigration crimes of trafficking in fraudulent documents and illegal re-entry; 
passing a fraudulent check; burglary; petty larceny; stolen property offenses; 
deceptive business practices; not performing duties as a government official; or a 
licensing violation.#'# With these changes, many property crimes, immigration 
crimes, and business crimes generated lower public safety scores. Individuals with 
petty larceny charges received half the points they previously would have and could 
achieve a low public safety risk assessment in Period 2.#'$  
On the other side of the equation, offenses increased from low to moderate 
severity included: domestic violence; drug possession (with the exception of 
marijuana); indecent exposure; bestiality; failure to register as a sex offender; 
necrophilia; offenses involving obscene material; prostitution offenses; and civil 
rights offenses.#'% Indecent exposure to a minor and a generic code for crimes 
involving the sexual exploitation of a minor were moved from low to high.#'&
Offenses related to the enticement of a minor for indecent purposes and procuring 
minors for prostitution were raised from moderate to high severity.#'' The scores 
attached to levels of severity and age of decay did not change, however.#'(
168 RCA Scenario Playbook, Version 1.0, supra note 22, at 323.
169 Id.
170 2012 RCA Helpful Hints, supra note 59, at 821.
171 RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 58, at 1758.
172 2012 Lessons Learned RCA Module, supra note 57, at 824; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra 
note 58, at 180.
173 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Crime Codes).
174 Id. (Point Based Scoring Rules); id. (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
175 Id. (Crime Codes). 
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. (Point Based Scoring Rules).
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822 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24.3
Additionally, the score for any gang association was reduced to five (down from 
seven), but was still scored higher than a recent moderate severity crime.#')
At the same time, the offense levels were adjusted for certain crimes, the 
maximum score for each public safety risk level was reduced so that more people 
would receive medium-risk and high-risk assessments and fewer would receive low-
risk assessments.#(* The new levels were as follows (prior score is struck through) 
and stayed the same for the remainder of our study period:#(#
Public Safety Risk
Minimum Maximum
Low 0 4 (Period 1)
3  (Period 2)
Medium 5 (Period 1)
4  (Period 2)
11 (Period 1)
8  (Period 2)
High 12 (Period 1)
9   (Period 2)
53
During this period, a low public safety risk assessment was impossible with any 
criminal history unless a sole offense was rated as low severity or was moderate 
severity and was at least five years old. Just two traffic offenses within the last five 
years would place someone in the medium public safety risk category. So too did a 
single drug possession conviction within the last five years, with its new moderate 
severity rating.#(" These offenses, therefore, precluded a release recommendation. 
Likewise, if within the last ten years, someone with a single drug possession charge 
had any other conviction (including a traffic offense), it would be impossible to 
receive a recommendation of release. As with the prior levels, a single charge for 
DUI or DV (regardless of age or actual conviction), would render someone a 
medium flight risk. Yet under the new risk levels, two charges would make the 
person a high safety risk, akin to having a conviction for arson within the past five
years. Conversely, individuals with petty larceny charges received half the points 
they previously would have and could achieve a low public safety score with the 
January 2014 changes.
Changes to the Flight Risk Rubric in Period 2:
The RCA system allows for manipulation of the assessment of risk through 
adjusting the scoring factors, the points assigned to each factor, and the risk level 
assigned to total points. Changes to any one of these rubrics affects the 
detain/release recommendation. While the public safety risk assessment system was 
manipulated in various ways between 2012 and 2015, the changes to how flight risk 
was assessed and how the public safety and flight risk levels were combined to 
generate detention and release recommendations were particularly dramatic. 
179 Id.
180 Id. (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
181 Id.
182 See id. (Point Based Scoring Rules).
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2020] MANIPULATING RISK 823
The points for prior voluntary returns or departures remained the same, but 
the scores for many of the other factors were changed (original score is struck 
through below).#(#
General Flight Risk Factors Score
Previously fled or avoided removal after a final order 1
2
Revocation of supervision in prior immigration case 1  
2
Violation of conditions of supervision in a prior 
immigration case
1  
2
Bond breach in an immigration or criminal case 1  
2
Walk-away from a non-secure facility or alternatives to 
detention program
1  
2
History of drug use  1 
Current drug user 2
Final removal order pending appeal -1
-2
Final order with no appeal pending 5
In immigration proceedings 0
Valid government identification -1
False identification document +1 per unique false 
name up to +2 total
Community Ties Score
Individual lives with immediate family members -1
-3
Individual has lived at address for six months or more -1
-3 
Individual has a stable address but has lived there for 
less than six months
 0 
Individual has no stable address +2
Benefit application is pending with USCIS -2
Service in the US Armed Forces by the migrant or 
spouse
-2
-3
Individual has a US citizen spouse or child -2 
-3
If no US citizen spouse or child, then migrant has 
spouse or child or other family members in the local 
community
-1 
If no US citizen spouse or child then whether the 
migrant has family in the US but not in the local 
community
 0 
183 Id. (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
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824 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24.3
Individual is enrolled in school or a training program -1 
Individual has work authorization -1
Individual owns property or considerable assets in the 
community
-1
-3
Individual has legal representation -1 
No established family or community support +2
The changes to the flight risk scoring rubric weighed certain community ties 
more heavily to reduce the Flight Risk scores while simultaneously adjusting the risk 
thresholds. Together these changes increased the number of migrants assigned a 
low risk of flight.#($ The new flight risk levels during Period 2 were:#(%
Flight Risk
Minimum Maximum
Low none -5  
-2
Medium -4  
-1 
1
 2 
High 2
3
none
Changes to RCA Detain/Release Recommendation in Period 2:
In combination, the changes to the public safety and flight risk rubrics in 2014 
aimed at reducing the rate of supervisor overrides by increasing the 
recommendations to detain individuals with a criminal history and increasing the 
recommendations to release individuals with community ties and no criminal 
history.#(& Specifically, the RCA rubric was changed so that no individual would 
receive a detain recommendation based on high flight risk but low public safety risk; 
this combination of risk factors instead resulted in a recommendation for the 
supervisor to determine detention or release.#(' And those with a low public safety 
score and a medium flight risk score were recommended for release.#((
At the same time, individuals with high public safety scores and medium or 
high flight risk scores, who were not subject to mandatory detention, no longer 
received a bond recommendation. This change coincided with ratcheting up scores 
assigned to certain criminal history so that more people would be categorized high 
risk to public safety and receive no bond unless they had overwhelming community 
ties.#() The shift shrunk the group of individuals who would receive a bond 
184 E-mail from ERO Taskings on behalf of Marc Rapp, Assistant Dir. For Law Enf’t Sys. 
& Analysis, regarding changes to the RCA Scoring Methodology, to Field Office Directors (Jan. 
6, 2014, 05:17 EST) [hereinafter 2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA
RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 39. 
185 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
186 2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change, supra note 184, at 39.
187 Id.
188 Id.; see also RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
189 2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change, supra note 184, at 39.
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recommendation from ICE and increased the number of migrants recommended 
for detention without bond even though they were eligible for one.#!" Supervisors 
could override and assign a bond, but the default for this group became no bond. 
As a result, if supervisors did not override the RCA recommendation and set a bond, 
migrants who were bond-eligible often had to wait weeks in order to seek a bond 
from an immigration judge despite their statutory eligibility for release.
Public Safety
Fl
ig
ht
 R
isk
0 to 4
0 to 3
5 to 11
4 to 8
12 or higher
9 or higher
-5 or 
lower
-2 or 
lower
Release Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain, Eligible 
for Bond
-4 to 1
-1 to 2
Supervisor to 
Determine
Release
Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain, Eligible 
for Bond
Detain
2 or 
higher
3 or 
higher
Detain, Eligible 
for Bond
Supervisor to 
determine
Detain, Eligible 
for Bond 
Detain, Eligible 
for Bond
Detain
Changes to the Mandatory Detention Rubric in Period 2:
The mandatory detention rubric was also changed in January 2014 to allow for 
more people to be released without requiring the supervisor to override the detain 
recommendation. Individuals who had a final order of removal, and had left the 
United States and later returned, no longer received an RCA recommendation of 
detain in the Custody of the Service (without bond) if they had a special 
vulnerability, which includes being a victim of trauma, and did not have a high 
public safety score.#!# The determination was left to the supervisor in these cases. 
This change meant that individuals fleeing harm who had passed a reasonable fear 
interview were not categorically recommended for detention without bond and 
could be released (with or without a bond) directly by ICE. With this change, a 
special justification for deviating from the RCA recommendation was no longer 
required. Thus, if a special vulnerability was identified, the RCA recommendations 
allowed for far more supervisor discretion:#!$
190 Id. 
191 See RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Point Based Scoring Rules).
192 Id. (Logic Based Scoring Rules). 
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Public Safety
Fl
ig
ht
 R
isk
Low Medium High
Low Detain
Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain
Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain
Medium Detain
Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain
Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain
High Detain
Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain
Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain
Additionally, individuals with an unexecuted removal order (i.e., had not left 
the United States) could be allowed to leave detention with or without bond, at the 
supervisor’s discretion, if the individual had a high flight risk score but low public 
safety score.#%#
Public Safety
Fl
ig
ht
 R
isk
Low Medium High
Low Release Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain
Medium Supervisor to 
Determine
Supervisor to 
Determine 
Detain
High Detain 
Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain Detain
C. The RCA Rubric: February 2015–October 2016 (Period 3)
President Obama’s 2014 announcement of a new three-tiered priority 
enforcement policy prompted major revisions to the RCA’s factors and scoring 
methodology in February 2015. These revisions were intended to align the RCA 
with the new prosecutorial priorities.#%$ The February 2015 changes cemented the 
use of the RCA as a tool to align detention with enforcement priorities. At this 
point, the RCA no longer used classic indicia of flight risk and manipulated the 
scoring of certain crimes so that drug possession and the offenses labeled serious 
misdemeanors would generally result in a medium risk public safety assessment and 
thus the recommendation for no-bond detention. We address the implications of 
this major shift in the RCA’s orientation in Part IV. We describe the specific changes 
to the algorithm here.
193 Id. 
194 2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change, supra note 184, at 39; E-mail from ERO Taskings 
on behalf of Marc Rapp, Assistant Dir. For Law Enf’t Sys. & Analysis, regarding changes to the 
RCA Scoring Methodology, to Field Office Directors (Feb. 11, 2015, 1:03 PM), in CONSOLIDATED 
FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 15–16.
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Changes to the Public Safety Rubric in Period 3:
The public safety rubric saw two major changes in the third period of this 
study. The first was the creation of a new offense severity level: “lowest.”#%& The 
lowest severity level offenses included traffic offenses (except those for hit and run, 
DUI, and transporting dangerous materials) and a general traffic offense code. 
These offenses had previously been categorized as low and therefore would have 
generated two points for the public safety score if they were the basis for the ICE 
encounter, or occurred within the last five years prior to the February 2015 
changes.#%' This addition finally took offenses like driving without a license—
common in states that do not provide drivers’ licenses to residents without proof 
of immigration status—out of the public safety risk evaluation. Under the prior 
rubric, two traffic offenses within the last five years equated to a medium public 
safety risk level. The February 2015 change recalibrated that assessment to better 
reflect actual threats to public safety.#%(
Severity Score
Lowest 0 
Low 2 
Moderate 4 
High 6 
Highest 7 
The other major change was the addition of a new Special Public Safety Factor 
called “serious misdemeanors.” These crimes generate seven points and thus make 
detention without bond the most likely recommendation. The new Special Public 
Safety Factors included drug distribution and weapons offenses.#%)
In addition to these two major changes, the score for gang affiliation was 
increased to 9.#%% This meant that any suspected association alone resulted in a high 
public safety score and a recommendation to detain without bond. The risk levels 
assigned to the public safety scores remained unchanged from January 2014 and 
were as follows:
195 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Crime Codes).
196 Id. (Crime Codes, Point Based Scoring Rules).
197 Id. (Point Based Scoring Rules).
198 NCIC Offense Severity Mapping Spreadsheet, in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES,
supra note 19, at 908–929. The new NCIC codes designated as serious misdemeanors and thus 
Special Public Safety Factors: carrying a concealed weapon, carrying a prohibited weapon, weapon 
registration violation, unauthorized possession of a weapon, firing a weapon, trafficking weapons, 
other weapons offenses, drug trafficking, and distributing hallucinogens; see also RCA RULES AND 
SCORING, supra note 94 (Point Based Scoring Rules).
199 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Point Based Scoring Rules).
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Public Safety Risk
Minimum Maximum
Low 0 4 (Period 1)
3  (Period 2 & 3)
Medium 5 (Period 1)
4  (Period 2 & 3)
11 (Period 1)
8  (Period 2 & 3)
High 12 (Period 1)
9   (Period 2 & 3)
53
Changes to the Flight Risk Rubric in Period 3:
The real action in Period 3 was to the flight risk algorithm. Here, the changes 
jettisoned most indicia of risk. Prior encounter history was eliminated as a factor. 
Instead, date of entry was the prime determinant of flight risk level with 14 points 
assigned to Obama’s high priority category of recent entrants."**
Encounter History  Entry Date Score
1 – 2 Voluntary Returns or Departures 2
3 or more Voluntary Returns or Departures 5
Entry without authorization after January 1, 2014 14
Unknown date of entry 1
Entry without authorization before January 1, 2014 0
The scores generated by most general flight risk factors and indicia of 
community ties were nullified and again replaced with scores keyed to the January 
1, 2014 cut-off date under the policy on enforcement priorities."*#
General Flight Risk Factors Score
Previously fled or avoided removal after a final order 1 (Period 1)
2 (Period 2)
Revocation of supervision in prior immigration case 1 (Period 1)
2 (Period 2)
Violation of conditions of supervision in a prior 
immigration case
1 (Period 1)
2 (Period 2)
Bond breach in an immigration or criminal case 1 (Period 1)
2 (Period 2)
Walk-away from a non-secure facility or alternatives to 
detention program
1 (Period 1)
2 (Period 2)
Abuse of a visa or visa waiver program 7 
History of drug use 1
Current drug user 2
Final removal order pending appeal -1
200 Id.
201 Id.
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-2 
Final order with no appeal pending 5
In immigration proceedings 0
Final order before Jan. 1, 2014 and previously removed 7
Final order before Jan. 1, 2014 and not previously 
removed
 1 
No final order 0
Valid government identification -1 
False identification document +1 per unique false 
name up to +2 total
Community Ties Score
Individual lives with immediate family members -1  (Period 1)
-3 (Period 2)
-1 
Individual has lived at address for six months or more -1  (Period 1)
-3 (Period 2)
-1
Individual has a stable address but has lived there for 
less than six months
 0 
Individual has no stable address +2
Benefit application is pending with USCIS -2
Service in the US Armed Forces by the migrant or 
spouse
-2  (Period 1)
-3 (Period 2)
-1
Individual has a US citizen spouse or child -2  (Period 1)
-3 (Period 2)
-1
If no US citizen spouse or child, then migrant has 
spouse or child or other family members in the local 
community
-1 
If no US citizen spouse or child then whether the 
migrant has family in the US but not in the local 
community
0 
Individual is enrolled in school or a training program -1
Individual has work authorization -1
Individual owns property or considerable assets in the 
community
-1  (Period 1)
-3 (Period 2)
-1
Individual has legal representation -1
No established family or community support +2
The calibration of public safety scores to risk levels also saw major changes in 
February 2015."*"
202 Id. (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
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Flight Risk
Minimum Maximum
Low none -5 (Period 1)
-2 (Period 2)
1 (Period 3)
Medium -4 (Period 1)
-1 (Period 2)
2 
 1 (Period 1)
2 (Period 2)
8 
High 2 (Period 1)
3 (Period 2)
9 
none
These changes made a few new politically-based factors determinative of the 
risk level. Entry after January 1, 2014, put a migrant in the high-risk category with 
14 points for that factor alone. A migrant with an unknown entry date and a final 
removal order from before January 1, 2014, who was not previously removed would 
receive two points and a medium risk classification if they did not have mitigating 
community ties or home stability. Someone who abused their visa or the visa waiver 
program or had received a removal order before January 1, 2014, and had been 
previously removed would almost always be classified as a medium flight risk with 
seven points. Indicators of strong ties to the United States and commitment to the 
immigration process, such as a pending benefits application, work authorization, 
legal counsel, or a pending appeal, were eliminated from the risk assessment 
altogether. Therefore, with only six possible negative points for community ties, it 
was nearly impossible for any person with any of these large point factors to be 
classified as low risk. At the same time, prior indicators of risk such as a history of 
absconding, previous immigration encounters, or having a final order with no 
appeal pending were not taken into account.
In February 2015, the detain/release recommendations based on combined 
public safety and flight risk scores were changed again. With this revision, the RCA 
no longer generated a bond recommendation for anyone. It thus recommended 
detention without bond for more than double the risk classifications. Further, the 
public safety thresholds did not change even though the recommendation to detain 
without bond was applied to all medium and high public safety groups."*#
203 Id.
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Public Safety
Low Medium High
Fl
ig
ht
 R
isk
0 to 3
0 to 4
4 to 8
5 to 11
9 or higher
12 or higher
Lo
w
-5 or 
lower
-2 or 
lower
1 or 
lower
Release (All 
Periods)
Supervisor to 
Determine 
(All Periods)
Detain, 
Eligible for 
Bond (Period 
1 & 2)
Detain (Period 
3)
M
ed
iu
m
-4 to 1
-1 to 2
2 to 8
Supervisor to 
Determine
(Period 1)
Release (Period 
2)
Supervisor to 
Determine
Supervisor to 
Determine
(Period 1 & 2)
Detain (Period 3)
Detain, 
Eligible for 
Bond
(Period 1) 
Detain (Period 
2 &3)
H
igh
2 or 
higher  
3 or 
higher
9 or 
higher
Detain, Eligible 
for Bond (Period 
1)
Supervisor to 
determine
(Period 2 & 3)
Detain, Eligible 
for Bond (Period 
1 & 2)
Detain (Period 3)
Detain, 
Eligible for 
Bond (Period 
1)
Detain (Period 
2 & 3)
As a consequence of the February 2015 changes, an individual who entered 
the U.S. after January 1, 2014, typically received the RCA recommendation of either 
“supervisor to determine” or detain without bond, depending on the public safety 
score."*$ People identified as abusers of the visa or visa waiver program also typically 
received a recommendation of supervisor to determine even if they had no criminal 
history."*& If the supervisor wanted to detain a person based on this factor alone 
though, additional approval was needed from the Field Office Director."*'
204 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Office of Enf’t and Removal Operations, RCA 
Executive Action Scoring Updates Guide (Feb. 2015), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra 
note 19, at 1496. 
205 Id. at 1497.
206 Id.
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Changes to the Mandatory Detention Rubric in Period 3:   
The mandatory detention rubric was restricted in February 2015 to increase 
the categories of individuals with unexecuted removal orders the RCA
recommended for detention without bond. Now individuals with medium flight risk 
and public safety scores were recommended for detention without bond along with 
those with low public safety scores and high flight risk scores. Given the changes to 
the flight risk algorithm, high flight risk was simply a function of the date of a 
removal order or entry after January 1, 2014.
Public Safety
Fl
ig
ht
 R
isk
Low Medium High
Low Release Supervisor to 
Determine
Detain 
Medium Supervisor to Determine Supervisor to 
determine (Period 1 
and 2)
Detain (Period 3)
Detain 
High Detain (Period 1)
Supervisor to Determine 
(Period 2)
Detain (Period 3)
Detain Detain 
Conversely, more individuals who had executed orders and returned to the 
United States were recommended for release. For individuals with special 
vulnerabilities, the supervisor was given the decision whether to detain or release 
even for those with a high public safety risk score. And the RCA was altered so that 
a special vulnerability was no longer required to avoid a recommendation of detain 
without bond for a few groups of people who represented a low risk to public safety.
D. The RCA Under Trump 
The final change to the RCA algorithm that has been documented occurred in 
2017. Despite the Obama Administration’s move to eliminate bond from the 
custody recommendation given by the RCA, the Trump Administration made the 
system yet more punitive. In 2017, Reuters News reported DHS eliminated the 
release recommendation altogether."*( With this additional manipulation, a person 
seeking to leave immigration detention, regardless of their low risk of flight and low 
risk to public safety, had to rely on a supervisor exercising favorable discretion or 
wait weeks to challenge their detention in immigration court. After striking the 
release recommendation, the rate of detention of individuals with no criminal 
history tripled."*)
207 Mica Rosenberg & Reade Levinson, Trump’s Catch-and-Detain Policy Snares Many Who Have 
Long Called U.S. Home, REUTERS (June 20, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/usa-immigration-court/.
208 Id.
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The RCA was designed to be highly configurable, with alterations possible to 
the factors assessed; the scores assigned to each factor; the severity of every criminal 
offense; the range of scores designating high, medium, or low risk levels; and the 
ultimate recommendation generated for various combinations of flight and public 
safety risk levels. Manipulation of any one of these variables has the power to 
increase or decrease the likelihood of custody for thousands of migrants. Our FOIA 
results reveal that DHS did indeed change the RCA’s algorithm in each of these 
ways. While adaptation of the algorithm is not inherently problematic, here the 
changes were not to calibrate risk measurements and limit unjustified detention; the 
changes instead largely abandoned risk and recommended expanded detention. The 
next Part examines the impact of particular manipulations as well as the RCA’s 
overall design on its ability to accomplish its stated purpose.
IV.  THE RCA’S FAILURE TO ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS
The architects of the RCA touted the system as a means to reduce harm to 
vulnerable individuals in detention"*% and increase transparency, standardization, 
and rationality in the use of civil immigration detention."#* The way in which the 
RCA was implemented and manipulated, however, subverted these goals. This Part 
examines the RCA tool against each of its policy objectives and identifies the design 
choices and subsequent changes to its algorithm that co-opted the tool for political 
ends.
A. Rationalization
The most significant shortcomings of the RCA relate to its central tenet: 
ensuring risk-based custody decisions. The break with the RCA’s fundamental
purpose stems from two policy choices. The first is tied to the primacy of local 
practice, such that the tail wags the dog. Instead of local ICE officers and 
supervisors conforming their detention decisions to risk-based assessments, the 
RCA algorithm and scoring rubric was altered to match preexisting policy and 
minimize supervisor overrides. Second, the RCA’s architecture conflates risk with 
enforcement preferences. This confusion was present to some degree in the RCA’s 
initial business rules; it was laid bare through subsequent manipulations of the RCA 
algorithm. By keying the flight risk assessment and the public safety risk assessment 
to prosecutorial priorities, the RCA ties detention recommendations to 
enforcement policy. This link lacks an underlying logic, however. Enforcement 
priorities do not necessarily correlate with a risk to public safety or risk of flight. 
The characteristics used to determine an individual’s priority for enforcement have 
no inherent bearing on the need for detention. The RCA, however, stopped 
distinguishing indicia of risk from political preference.
Turning first to the primacy of local policy, the RCA architects not only 
allowed field offices to override the system’s recommendations independent of risk, 
they also re-engineered the methodology to conform to local custom. The RCA’s 
209 UNHCR Roundtable, supra note 54, at 25.
210 See CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 33, 420, 503, 1112, 1739; RCA
SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 4.
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scoring system was changed significantly in January 2014."## With these changes, 
ICE headquarters issued a memo to all field offices explaining that the changes were 
made to “strengthen alignment both with ICE priorities and with the actual 
Detain/Release decisions currently being generated by ERO RCA end users.”"#"
The anticipated result being “a decrease in the number of times supervisors need to 
override RCA recommendations.”"## This included responsive scoring changes that 
would “place greater emphasis on aliens’ criminal records” so that fewer migrants 
received a public safety score of low."#$
The scoring changes included increasing the severity of drug possession 
crimes, which are generally misdemeanor offenses, from low to medium."#& At the 
same time, the threshold scores for assessment as low risk and as moderate risk 
were lowered."#' The combination of these changes meant the RCA would no 
longer recommend release for someone with a single drug possession charge within 
the past five years. Even if the possession conviction was nearly ten years old, if the 
migrant had a single subsequent traffic offense (not DUI), the individual would be 
deemed a moderate public safety risk and would not be recommended for release. 
Similarly, someone with two traffic offenses (not DUI) within the last five years was 
now deemed a moderate risk."#( Instead, those migrants labeled as a moderate risk 
to public safety would either receive the “supervisor to determine” outcome or 
detain, eligible for bond recommendation. Consequently, for many of these 
migrants, now deemed moderate risks based on the same characteristics previously 
deemed low risk, there would be no record of supervisors overriding release 
recommendations nor the requirement that they explain that decision.
To be clear, the FOIA results show that these changes were based on 
supervisors’ decisions to detain individuals with criminal history, not evidence that 
individuals the RCA previously labeled as low risk to public safety had indeed been 
released and committed new crimes. Conduct that had previously been evaluated as 
low risk to others was simply relabeled as moderate. Changes intended to reduce 
supervisor overrides of the RCA recommendation mean that end users’ detention 
practices were generating the risk assessment methodology rather than the reverse. 
Instead of industry-standard risk methodology informing the use of civil detention, 
the customary use of detention was driving the methodology.
211 See supra notes 174–93 (discussing all changes to the RCA rubric from January 2014 to 
February 2015).
212 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Office of Enforcement and Removal 
Operations, Risk Classification Assessment (RCA) in EARM 5.3 Quick Reference Guide 5–6
(revised Aug. 2013) [hereinafter RCA in EARM 5.3, Quick Reference Guide], in CONSOLIDATED 
FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 1734–44.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 See supra notes 175–82, 190. The January 2014 scoring changes did not universally ratchet 
up the consequences for criminal history though. Petty larceny offenses and immigration crimes,
such as illegal re-entry, were reduced in severity so that individuals with criminal history involving
theft or border crossing could receive an assessment of low risk and be recommended for release. Id.
216 See supra notes 173–82.
217 See supra notes 180–83.
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The second driver away from risk-based detention lies with the use of the RCA 
to implement the executive branch’s immigration enforcement priorities. An early 
frequently-asked-questions resource makes clear that the RCA “was developed to 
better support ICE immigration enforcement priorities.”"#) The link between 
enforcement policy and risk assessment is fundamentally flawed. The RCA’s “risk” 
levels mirrored the executive branch’s enforcement priorities, but enforcement 
priorities do not necessarily correspond to the danger someone poses or their 
likelihood of flight. A person who has recently entered the United States to seek 
asylum is not inherently dangerous or likely to evade enforcement. In fact, data 
show the opposite to be true."#% These migrants have been priorities for 
enforcement under both the Obama and Trump administrations. Regardless of 
one’s views on the lack of wisdom and humanity embodied by those policies, the 
fact that these migrants are an enforcement priority does not render them high risks. 
The automated system, however, imposed detention on groups of migrants 
identified as enforcement priorities, whether or not the groups shared 
characteristics associated with risk of flight or dangerousness. Indeed, with the 
changes in Period 3, actual indicia of risk became nearly irrelevant to the system’s 
determination that a migrant represented a high, medium, or low risk of flight. Here, 
the FOIA results reveal that the RCA broke with its fundamental purpose.
A guide to the overhaul of the RCA algorithm in February 2015 is explicit 
about the system’s redesign to align detention with enforcement policy, not risk. 
The guide sets out the executive’s priorities alongside the recommendations the 
RCA would typically generate after the changes to its rubric:""*
Priority 1 Known or suspected 
terrorists
Detain (no bond)
Aliens apprehended at the 
border
Supervisor to determine or 
detain
Suspected Gang affiliation Detain (no bond)
Felons Detain (no bond)
Aggravated Felons Detain (no bond)
Priority 2 3 or more misdemeanors Supervisor to determine or 
detain
218 2012 FAQ, supra note 101, at 1326.
219 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRANTS AND FAMILIES APPEAR IN COURT:
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 1 (2019) (“Comprehensive analyses of the government’s own 
data show that in the vast majority of situations, immigrants placed into removal proceedings 
appear for all of their court hearings.”); WALTER A. EWING ET AL., THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2015) (“[I]nnumerable studies have confirmed two 
simple yet powerful truths about the relationship between immigration and crime: immigrants are 
less likely to commit serious crimes or be behind bars than the native-born, and high rates of 
immigration are associated with lower rates of violent crime and property crime.”); Most Released 
Families Attend Immigration Court Hearings, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 
18, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/562 (finding that the vast majority of “newly 
arriving” asylum seekers attend their initial court hearings).
220 RCA in EARM 5.3, Quick Reference Guide, supra note 212, at 1789.
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Significant misdemeanor Supervisor to determine or 
detain (due to a special public 
safety factor designation)
Entry after 1/1/14 Supervisory to determine or 
detain (if high flight risk 
score)
Abuse of visa or visa waiver 
program
Supervisor to determine (if 
medium flight risk score)
Priority 3 Final order after 1/1/14 Supervisor to determine (if 
medium flight risk score)
Non-Priority All other Release (will receive low 
safety and low flight risk 
scores)
These changes to the RCA custody recommendations were implemented 
largely through the flight risk component. Many of the factors to measure home 
stability, community ties, and prior immigration encounters and absconding became 
largely irrelevant and were replaced with factors keyed to January 1, 2014—the date 
determined by the Obama Administration as indicating a recent entry or recent 
order of removal—even though this date is not inherently indicative of a high risk 
of flight.""# These changes made a few new politically-based factors determinative 
of risk level.
The use of the RCA to impose detention based on enforcement priority level 
is evident to a lesser degree in the public safety component. Here, the algorithm is 
designed to weigh heavily any criminal history, including charges alone, for certain 
offenses that coincide with enforcement policy. These offenses are identified as 
“Special Public Safety Factors.”""" From the RCA’s creation until February 2015, 
they were limited to domestic violence (DV) and driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs (DUI) at which point drug distribution and weapons offenses were 
added to the list. These crimes are scored equivalently to the highest severity 
offenses notwithstanding the fact that both DUI and DV offenses were initially 
designated as low severity crimes. As a result, the RCA deems a charge for DUI 
akin to a charge of arson that endangers life, kidnapping, or intentional homicide.""#
The RCA’s architects understood the fundamental disconnect between the 
scores assigned the “Special Public Safety Factors” and their relation to risk. The 
designers compensated for the overvaluation of these offenses in the detention 
determination rubric by their excessive score from the custody classification system. 
For those individuals to be detained, the RCA recommends a low, medium/low, 
medium/high, or high custody classification level.""$ The custody classification is 
designed to match the detention facility’s security measures to the individual’s 
dangerousness. This custody classification uses the public safety score minus the 
221 Ingrid Eagly et al., Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 785, 811 (2018).
222 See supra notes 107–110, 198 (discussing special public safety factors). 
223 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (Point Based Scoring Rules).
224 RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 62, at 899. 
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special public safety score. Instead, the custody classification algorithm scores those 
offenses according to their severity level, which was low or moderate depending on 
the offense and time period.""& Were the special public safety offenses to represent 
dangerousness, their score should not vary based on their use. From the outset, 
however, the risk score used to determine the detain/release recommendation gave 
them disproportionate weight, while the rubric determining the security precautions 
required weighed them according to their actual dangerousness. Because the 
offenses were enforcement priorities, detention was designed to follow. Again, the 
RCA subordinates indicia of risk to political preference for detention.
Migrants with gang affiliations were also designated as a high enforcement 
priority under the Obama administration. Like with date of entry or DUI charge, 
the RCA gave this factor disproportionate weight. The FOIA results show that gang 
affiliation was also weighted as high as or higher than the highest severity offenses 
for much of the RCA’s history.""' This is particularly significant given how broadly 
this factor was applied. RCA users are instructed to designate a migrant as gang 
affiliated in the following circumstances: self-identifying as a member, having 
tattoos identifying a specific STG, being seen displaying STG signs or symbols, 
being identified through an untested informant, being arrested with other STG 
members on at least two occasions, being identified as a member by the facility 
warden or administrator, being identified as a member in a written correspondence, 
possessing other STG indicia, or being identified as a member through documented 
reasonable suspicion.""(
A key training document underscores the strictness with which this factor is to 
be applied."") The manual describes the person as having gang-related tattoos visible 
and being identified as a gang member by Homeland Security Investigations in a 
raid.""% The manual explains that the ICE officer determines that the person was 
“strongly connected with the gang in his teens, but has since distanced himself, 
choosing instead to focus on the support of his siblings.”"#* Despite this, the manual 
indicates that he should be scored as affiliated with a gang, receiving the same 
number of points as someone who currently self-identifies as an active member of 
a gang."## The high number of points assigned for a suspected affiliation and the 
breadth of this factor means that migrants will not be recommended for release 
regardless of the strength of the evidence on which affiliation is based or the current 
status of that affiliation.
By eliminating many of the factors that reflect risk and replacing many of them 
with policy-based metrics, the RCA’s algorithm lost the ability to measure true risk. 
Instead, it became a tool of prosecution, pairing detention with enforcement 
preference regardless of risk.
225 Id. at 1030, 1036–37. 
226 See supra notes 126, 179, 199 (describing the security threat group or gang affiliation factor 
and its scoring over time). 
227 RCA Worksheet Instructions, supra note 148, at 1647. 
228 2012 RCA Scenario Playbook, supra note 143, at 305–15.
229 Id. at 311.
230 Id. at 312.
231 Id. at 315.
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B. Standardization
A principal goal of the RCA was to standardize custody decisions across ICE 
Enforcement and Removal Operations’ 24 field offices."#" By accepting supervisor 
overrides for entire categories of migrants based on field office policy and declining 
to make detention or release recommendations for large groups of moderate-risk 
individuals, the RCA sacrificed standardization from the start. Instead, geography 
continues to drive detention, in place of risk.
Standardization appeared to be a high priority for the RCA. A document to all 
ERO personnel accompanying the RCA’s rollout explained that the automated 
program “provides officers and supervisors with a standardized recommendation 
and decision tool based on ICE policies, procedures and enforcement priorities.”"##
It would result in “consistent recommendations” for the use of immigration 
custody."#$ At the same time, the goal of standardization and uniformity had to be 
balanced against the role of supervisor discretion. An automated program deciding 
whether to detain or release someone without human review would be 
unacceptable. Individual officers needed to retain ultimate responsibility for the 
final decisions to detain or release the migrants before them. Thus, from the 
beginning, the twin objectives of standardizing custody decisions and retaining 
human oversight sat in inevitable tension. The RCA, however, engaged in very little 
balancing of these dual goals. Instead, the RCA prioritized the policies of individual 
field offices and preferences of supervisors again and again such that 
standardization could never result.
With its initial communication to RCA users, DHS officials made clear that the 
RCA “does not replace local bond guidance and discretion.”"#& Shortly after the 
RCA was implemented nationally, DHS officials quantified the impact of local 
policy. As of February 2013, supervisors were overriding the RCA recommendation 
25% of the time."#' The single biggest cause of overrides was expedited removal. 
At the time, these cases were receiving “detain, eligible for bond” recommendations, 
which supervisors were changing to “detain in the custody of the service.”"#( The 
second largest reason for supervisor overrides was criminal history that included an 
arrest or conviction for driving under the influence. In roughly 30% of cases 
involving a conviction or charge for DUI, supervisors were overriding the RCA’s 
recommendation of “detain, eligible for bond” and choosing to detain without 
bond."#) The response of the RCA’s designers was not to align the policy of those 
“field offices [that] do not offer bond to aliens w[ith] DUI/DWI in their criminal 
record” with the system’s risk-based custody recommendation, but rather to 
“ensure [that] DUI cases are scored according to current ICE policy and make 
scoring changes, if necessary.”"#% DHS accepted this variation and prioritized local 
232 Morton Testimony, supra note 15, at 16; GAO Questions Regarding the RCA, supra note 20, at 37.
233 2012 FAQ, supra note 101, at 1326.
234 Id.; GAO Questions Regarding the RCA, supra note 20, at 37.
235 2012 FAQ, supra note 101, at 1326.
236 2013 RCA Overview, supra note 57, at 232.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 233.
239 Id. at 238.
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policy over standardized decision-making in the RCA."$* Indeed, DHS 
acknowledged the primacy of local policy as a challenge to the RCA’s 
implementation in its report to the Government Accountability Office. DHS 
officials stated that “[f]or example, there are varying local policies and procedures 
on how aliens encountered for DUI offenses are processed—some field offices 
automatically detain these aliens while others set a standard $25,000 bond amount” 
and explained that “supervisors in a specific location may find that they are 
continually required to override the RCA generated recommendations for aliens 
with specific characteristics.”"$#
Structurally, the RCA avoids standardizing the custody recommendation for 
migrants evaluated as middling risks. The RCA includes the recommendation of 
“supervisor to determine,” which obviates the need for a supervisor to override the 
system or provide a justification. Functionally, the “supervisor to determine” result 
is a blank slate, not a recommendation. For this group of migrants, the RCA 
contains no custody guidance. The decision depends exclusively on the supervisor’s 
discretion. The FOIA release showed that this no-recommendation 
recommendation was issued by the RCA for different risk classifications over time. 
Initially, anyone with some combination of medium-low flight and public safety risk 
levels was delegated to the supervisor to determine."$" This outcome was extended 
to individuals with low public safety risk but high flight risk levels in January 2014 
(accompanied by an increase in the threshold for high flight risk)."$# It was 
subsequently removed for individuals with medium flight and public safety risks and 
replaced with a detain (no bond) recommendation."$$With a large swath of migrants 
receiving no real custody recommendation from the RCA, the automated system 
could never standardize the decision-making process or the detention outcomes the 
way its proponents promised.
The center group of risk combinations with no actual custody or release 
recommendation reflect the system’s attempt to incorporate prosecutorial 
discretion and its inability to standardize this process. In addition to its other goals, 
the system “support[ed] the use of prosecutorial discretion by capturing important 
factors that agents/officers and supervisors should consider in making informed 
custody decisions.”"$& The use of the RCA to facilitate prosecutorial discretion came 
at the expense of standardization and transparency, however.
The RCA simply did not capture and consolidate all factors the Obama 
administration identified as relevant or guide supervisors when they were present. 
Positive factors included the length of presence in the U.S., circumstances and age 
at the time of entry, educational history, service in the military, ties to the U.S., ties 
to and conditions in the home country, age, close family members with status in the 
U.S., likelihood of being granted relief through a family member or as a victim of 
240 GAO Questions Regarding the RCA, supra note 20, at 37.
241 Id.
242 See supra note 141. 
243 See supra note 187. 
244 See supra note 203. 
245 2012 Key User Training, supra note 67, at 1109.
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crime or persecution, and participation in law enforcement efforts."$' Negative 
factors included risks to national security, criminal history that includes serious 
felonies or numerous offenses, known gang members, and individuals with a record 
of illegal re-entry or immigration fraud."$( Some of these factors were incorporated 
into the RCA’s algorithm, such as criminal history, gang involvement, re-entry 
violations, military service, and eligibility for family-based visas. Conversely, ICE 
officials acknowledged from the outset that the RCA does not take into account 
other factors that should be considered when deciding whether to detain someone, 
specifically: being a threat to national security, eligibility for a U or T visa, length of 
lawful status in the U.S., entry as a minor, lack of ties to the home country, 
conditions in the home country, or nationality that renders removal unlikely."$)
Under the Obama administration, supervisors were instructed to consider all factors 
when deciding whether to agree with the RCA recommendation or make a 
detain/release determination in the first instance."$% These factors are not displayed 
automatically. Rather, the supervisor must click on an “info” link to generate a pop-
up window with the additional prosecutorial discretion factors for consideration."&*
The RCA did not produce standardized recommendations based on these factors, 
nor did it require supervisors to document when and why they were exercising 
discretion, so that the goal of transparency was not served either.
Generally, supervisors used their discretion to impose detention without bond. 
Within a month of its national rollout, an RCA was completed for 83% of migrants 
taken into custody."&# At that time, the RCA recommended detention (no bond) for 
47% of the migrants processed; 33% received a recommendation of detention with 
a bond; 0.8% were recommended for release; and 20% received the 
recommendation that the supervisor should determine whether to detain or release 
the individual."&" The actual decisions approved by the supervisors skewed heavily 
toward no bond detention with 76% detained without bond; 15% detained with a 
bond; and 10% released on community supervision."&#
The FOIA results make clear that as between centralized policymakers and 
dispersed ERO supervisors, the latter won out. With that fundamental choice in 
place, the system is unable to standardize the process and outcomes of ICE’s 
detention decisions.
246 Id. at 1110.
247 Id. at 1111.
248 Id. at 1136; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 11.
249 RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 11.
250 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1385.
251 2013 RCA Overview, supra note 57, at 229. Initial rates of completing the RCA were much 
lower in the jurisdictions covered by the San Antonio, Dallas, and El Paso field offices. Id. This 
may have been the result of the initial requirement that an RCA was completed for individuals 
subject to expedited removal, which was later changed. 
252 Id. at 230.
253 Id.
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C. Transparency
Former ICE Director John Morton told Congress that the RCA would 
“improve transparency and uniformity in detention custody and classification 
decisions.”"&$ Likewise, the RCA’s designers introduced the program to all ICE 
personnel as one that “not only increases standardization, but also increases 
transparency for detention and community supervision decisions.”"&& The promise 
of increased transparency, however, did not extend to immigration judges, attorneys 
representing those detained, or the migrants themselves. Further, the system’s 
design and its outcomes have long been hidden from scholars and experts in risk 
assessment and immigration detention. The prolonged process required to force 
compliance with our FOIA requests is emblematic of DHS’s resistance to any 
oversight of the RCA.
ICE alone sees the assessment of risk. After the RCA is complete, ICE officers 
are instructed to print a detailed summary of the RCA results and place that 
document in the individual’s A-file (the file that captures all immigration-related 
matters for the individual) and the person’s detention file."&' The person 
recommended for detention or release does not receive a copy of the RCA detailed 
summary. This document is not generally released as part of a migrant’s request for 
her own A-file but is instead redacted. For those people detained by ICE who 
challenge the terms of that detention in immigration court, neither the immigration 
judge nor the migrant’s attorney receive the RCA detailed summary to review in 
that process. The attorney is unable to challenge the flight risk and public safety risk 
levels assigned through the RCA, as they are not disclosed. Until now, advocates 
could not have known the factors the RCA uses to recommend detention, release 
or bond, which would allow them to examine the reliability of the facts underlying 
the risk assessments and provide countervailing evidence. Furthermore, the secrecy 
surrounding the RCA’s methodology means that attorneys have been unaware of
the changes that moved the RCA away from measuring indicia of risk and toward 
detaining anyone who was a prosecutorial priority, regardless of her risk level. 
Immigration judges reviewing ICE’s custody determinations are also kept in the 
dark as to the RCA recommendations and methodology and are thus hampered in 
their ability to scrutinize ICE’s assertions of risk and ensure that civil detention is 
indeed justified."&( With no transparency of the RCA in bond hearings, ICE officers 
are not accountable for their mistakes in administering the RCA and DHS attorneys 
do not have to defend the methodology to adjudicators.
More broadly, the RCA’s algorithm and outcomes have been shielded from 
public view for years. Extracting documents from DHS required numerous 
administrative appeals, multiple complaints in federal court by pro bono experts in 
254 Morton Testimony, supra note 15, at 16. 
255 RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 58, at 1739.
256 2012 FAQ, supra note 101, at 1328.
257 Noferi & Koulish, supra note 12, at 84–85; see also Gilman, supra note 42, at 187–90
(arguing that bond hearings do not provide any meaningful review of the initial decision to detain, 
but rather serve only to review the bond amount set). As a form of “civil” detention, non-
detention is the default. Id. at 172. Detention is usually only justified when the person has been 
shown to be a flight risk or danger to the community through an individualized determination. Id.  
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FOIA litigation, a lengthy settlement period, and continued pressure to release all 
information DHS had previously agreed to in the settlement."&) Additionally, the 
FOIA results include no indication that the RCA’s methodology was adjusted based 
on evidence of its accuracy in predicting risk of flight or risk to public safety. The 
program’s designers state that “the methodology is based on current industry 
standard risk assessment techniques.”"&% The FOIA results, however, do not 
contain information on the substance of this “industry standard,” how it 
accommodates the purported civil nature of immigration detention,"'* or any sign 
it was recalibrated to reflect actual flight or public safety outcomes—information 
that is commonly available for analysis and critique in criminal risk assessment 
tools."'#
258 See supra Part I. 
259 RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 58, at 1739. 
260 Legal scholar César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández argues that, despite persistent 
characterization as such by the media and legal professionals alike, the immigration detention 
framework was not actually meant to be a civil system. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, 
Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1350 (2014). Instead, it was developed 
alongside the aggressively antidrug policies and mass incarceration legislation of the 1980s and 
1990s and was similarly meant to serve as a deterrent to drug activity. Id. As a result, “[t]oday, 
immigration detention stands apart from other types of detention deemed civil and instead looks 
to people outside and inside the hundreds of jails, prisons, and stand-alone detention facilities that 
have been used for this purpose as if those confined are being punished just the same as people 
serving time for a conviction.” Id.  
261 Comparison of the RCA with the methodology and development of risk assessment tools 
used in the criminal justice system is necessary to identify opportunities for reform and persistent 
shortcomings of risk assessment algorithms across context. This comparative analysis is beyond 
the scope of this Article. We hope that with the mechanics of the RCA now made public through 
this Article, further evaluation that builds on the substantial literature on risk tools in the criminal 
justice system will be possible. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY 
L.J. 59, 88–101 (2017) (describing the process of developing risk tools); Brandon L. Garrett & 
John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CAL. L. REV. 439, 441–42 (2020) (describing the use of risk 
assessment in pre-trial bail determinations, sentencing, parole, and probation and their empirical 
results); John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 493–94 (2016) (describing use of risk assessment in sentencing). Risk 
assessment tools in criminal justice systems, particularly in the federal system, are characterized
by greater transparency and review than for the RCA. Virginia State Crime Commission, Virginia 
Pre-Trial Data Project: Preliminary Statewide Findings (Dec 13, 2019); Brandon L. Garrett, Federal 
Criminal Risk Assessment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 125 (2019) (describing the transparency, 
validation, annual evaluation, and public review of bias in decision-making required in the 
Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person (FIRST 
STEP) Act). This is not to say that increased transparency and scrutiny is sufficient, as numerous 
scholars have argued these tools are ineffective in overcoming racial bias and mass incarceration 
in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Garrett & Monahan, Judging Risk, supra (advocating for 
increased regulation concerning the use of risk assessment); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out,
128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2227 (2019) (critiquing the use of risk assessment that is not race conscious); 
Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 803, 806–808 (2014) (critiquing use of risk assessment at sentencing). The availability of data 
on the deployment of these tools in criminal justice, though, has allowed for a rigorous debate 
regarding the impact of these tools that has not been possible with respect to the effect of the 
RCA on mass immigration incarceration to date. See generally DAVID G. ROBINSON & LOGAN 
KOEPKE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 3 (2019),
http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Robinson-Koepke-
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Years of secrecy have allowed errors and inaccuracies to go undetected and 
therefore unchallenged by advocates and scholars. The most dramatic example we 
found was an apparent error in designating who is subject to mandatory detention. 
The FOIA results show that the mandatory detention component of the RCA was 
coded to designate a conviction for the crime of violating an order of protection as 
triggering mandatory detention under the INA."'" A conviction for this category of 
crimes does render a migrant removable."'# It does not, however, render the person 
subject to mandatory detention."'$ Congress did not include this allegation of 
removability in its list of removal grounds triggering mandatory detention. The error 
in the RCA’s programming to include this removal ground in the mandatory 
detention rubric may well have led to thousands of migrants receiving the custody 
recommendation and decision of “detain in the custody of the service” (i.e. no 
bond) instead of “detain, eligible for bond” with an accompanying bond 
recommendation based on risk scores.
The RCA may deliver some degree of transparency within ICE as to the 
characteristics of migrants detained by different field offices across the country"'&
but its custody decisions remain otherwise opaque. Without public scrutiny, the 
program’s impact on detained migrants has gone unchallenged and the 
manipulation of its algorithm to jettison indicia of risk has up to now evaded review.
D. Harm Reduction
Finally, the RCA was developed in part to respond to mounting reports of men 
and women dying or suffering severe harm in immigration detention."'' U.S. 
officials described the system to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) as a means for ensuring that ICE agents screen immigrants for 
special vulnerabilities and do not detain vulnerable individuals unless mandated by 
statute."'( Prior to the RCA’s creation, information concerning an individual’s 
vulnerabilities was not captured in any of ICE’s databases. The RCA thus required 
documentation of any vulnerability and allowed DHS to standardize custody 
determinations for this population as well as track their overall detention rates."')
The FOIA results show though that poor screening mechanisms, the broad ambit 
of supervisor discretion, and the absence of any feedback loop between RCA users 
and detention center administrators thwarted the system’s ability to deliver on this 
promise.
Civil-Rights-Critical-Issue-Brief.pdf (describing the debates regarding the use of actuarial risk 
tools in pretrial detention).
262 See RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94 (listing allegations of removability under 
INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) as subject to mandatory detention per statutes 
and allegations).
263 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2012).
264 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), (c) (2012).
265 See generally RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58.
266 UNHCR Roundtable, supra note 54, at 24–25.
267 Id.
268 2012 Key User Training, supra note 67, at 1119.
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Guidance to RCA users on how to assess the presence of a special vulnerability 
is minimal despite the context of the interview and the sensitivity of the information 
sought. ICE officers can access pop-up windows that contain a list of questions to 
ask and observations to make for each vulnerability, but the RCA provides no 
training on how to effectively elicit responses."'% The RCA includes a link to a quick 
reference guide for special vulnerabilities and a summary of other resources."(* The 
guide reiterates the guidance from the pop-up windows and suggests a few 
additional questions and observations."(# The summary of other resources directs 
agents to ICE’s other courses on immigration benefits available for victims of sexual 
abuse or domestic violence, victims of human trafficking, asylum seekers, and 
USCIS’s guide on adjudicating LGBTI asylum claims."(" The RCA implementation 
materials do not require officers to complete these trainings, but reference them for 
information about the circumstances of these crimes and how to identify victims."(#
The RCA training materials provide no guidance regarding the location to conduct 
these screenings, nor do the FOIA results indicate that they were carried out in a 
private and confidential setting.
Additionally, the RCA does not include a mechanism or instructions for 
communication between RCA users and the officers who administrator the
detention facility. Because physical and mental illnesses are diagnosed in and caused 
by immigration detention,"($ we requested information about whether the RCA was 
rerun if a special vulnerability was later identified or emerged at the detention center. 
The RCA is rerun based on subsequent disciplinary infractions."(& We also requested 
any guidance on informing the detention center of any special vulnerability 
identified through the RCA."(' As part of the settlement, we required a certification 
269 RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 73, at 1365–68.
270 Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide, supra note 74, at 1491–92; U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Summary of Other 
Resources that can be Linked to Special Vulnerability Training [hereinafter Summary of Other 
Resources], in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 1674–75.
271 See supra notes 73–93 which outline the guidance provided for assessing the designated 
special vulnerabilities. 
272 Summary of Other Resources, supra note 270, at 1674–75.
273 Id.
274 See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., JUSTICE FREE ZONES: U.S.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 31–43 (2020) (detailing the 
detention conditions that lead to physical and mental illness); Jessica Leung et al., Mumps in 
Detention Facilities that House Detained Migrants – United States, September 2018–August 2019, 68 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 749 (2019) (CDC report detailing mumps outbreak in 
detention centers); Nora Ellman, Immigration Detention Is Dangerous for Women’s Health and Rights,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 21, 2019, 9:04 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
women/reports/2019/10/21/475997/immigration-detention-dangerous-womens-health-rights 
(identifying the ways in which detention erodes the “maternal health, reproductive autonomy, and 
mental health” of women); Matthew Haag, Thousands of Immigrant Children Said They Were Sexually 
Abused in U.S. Detention Centers, Report Says, NY TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/02/27/us/immigrant-children-sexual-abuse.html (detailing findings from the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement on sexual abuse of detained unaccompanied minors).
275 CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19, at 376–80, 938, 1009–16; RCA
SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 93–96.
276 See RCA Special Vulnerabilities FOIA Request, supra note 31, at 7.
42513-lcb_24-3 S
heet N
o. 63 S
ide A
      08/03/2020   09:57:48
42513-lcb_24-3 Sheet No. 63 Side A      08/03/2020   09:57:48
C M
Y K
LCB_24_3_Art_2_Evans_&_Koulish.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/13/20 11:33 PM
2020] MANIPULATING RISK 845
that DHS had released all documents addressing communication between RCA 
users and detention centers about the presence of special vulnerabilities. The FOIA 
response contained no indication that communication regarding special 
vulnerabilities occurred in either direction, but DHS certified that any related 
documents were included in the FOIA release. Therefore, it appears the RCA 
provides no direction or avenue to reassess detention based on the detection of a 
special vulnerability at the detention facility nor any formal means of alerting 
detention center operators that the migrant possesses a vulnerability and needs to 
be accommodated. As a result, the RCA omits the most likely source of data on 
detained migrants with special vulnerabilities: the detention centers themselves. And 
the RCA squanders the opportunity to protect vulnerable detainees through 
standardized communication with the detention facilities.
Even if a special vulnerability is detected, the RCA recommendation delegates 
broad discretion to the supervisor with respect to imposing detention. Furthermore, 
the RCA’s designers recognized from the beginning that this discretion could be 
wielded differently across field offices based on their divergent policies. The RCA 
Playbook and online RCA training course use scenarios involving three migrants. 
One of the migrants is identified as having a “serious physical illness” based on his 
hospitalization for diabetes, medication for diabetes and high blood pressure, and 
reported kidney problems."(( Yet, this example of a special vulnerability—the only 
one in the RCA training materials—also comes with a caveat that undermines the 
screening tool’s fundamental purpose. While the officer in the training materials 
recommends release due to the special vulnerability, the official guidance explicitly 
states this outcome is not required even for similar cases."() The training guide also 
explains that the presence of a special vulnerability based on these factors was 
agreed upon by a panel of RCA developers and ICE officials, “however, they do 
not represent the required decisions that must be reached when using the system.” 
Instead, the circumstances of each case “and each field office will influence” the 
decision-making process."(%
The RCA recommendation for nearly all migrants with an identified special 
vulnerability is for the “supervisor to determine” whether to detain or release the 
person; those with low flight and public safety risk levels are recommended for 
release.")* The training course recommends that individuals with identified special 
vulnerabilities and low or medium public safety and flight risk scores be considered 
for release.")# Training to supervisors on how to exercise their discretion directs 
them to consider the nature and severity of the vulnerability, the crimes committed, 
the risk factors involved, and the capacity of the facility to address the vulnerability 
when deciding whether to detain the person.")"
Initial data from the FOIA results reveal that the RCA was far less effective in 
preventing the detention of individuals with special vulnerabilities than U.S. officials 
277 RCA Scenario Playbook, Version 1.0, supra note 22, at 310.
278 Id. at 321.
279 Id. at 285.
280 RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94.  
281 RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 58, at 80.
282 Id.
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represented to UNHCR. Six months after the RCA was rolled out, the RCA 
Working Group reported that 6.3% of individuals processed through the system 
were identified as having one or more special vulnerabilities and that of this 
population 27% were released.")# Thirty-seven percent of migrants with a special 
vulnerability and no basis for mandatory detention were released.")$ Those most 
likely to be released had no final order, no mandatory detention charge and were 
disabled, elderly, pregnant, nursing, a primary caretaker, had a serious mental illness, 
or serious physical illness. Additionally, 20% of those who had a special vulnerability 
plus either a final order or were subject to mandatory detention or expedited 
removal were released.")& In the reverse, the RCA’s early results reflect that 63% of 
individuals with no basis for mandatory detention were held in custody despite their 
identified special vulnerabilities. Though presence of a special vulnerability may 
substantially increase the likelihood of a migrant’s release, these early data also show 
that the majority of people designated as vulnerable are detained by ICE 
notwithstanding ICE’s statutory power to release them and the RCA’s purpose to 
reduce their harm.
V.  THE RCA’S MANIPULATION RESULTS IN AN AUTOMATED 
SYSTEM OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL DETENTION
The constitutionality of civil immigration detention remains contested and the 
subject of recent Supreme Court review.")' According to the Court, government 
detention violates the Due Process clause “unless the detention is ordered in a 
criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections” or, in the case of civil 
detention “in certain special and ‘narrow’ nonpunitive ‘circumstances.’”")( These 
circumstances are limited to mitigating an individual’s “danger to the 
community”")) and risk of “[non-]appearance . . . at future immigration 
proceedings.”")% For the past twenty years, the Court has reaffirmed that 
immigration detention satisfies due process when it is based on the risk an individual 
will abscond or engage in criminal activity if released."%* Even when upholding 
mandatory detention for certain categories of migrants, the Court has found that 
the defining characteristics relate to risk."%#
This Section focuses on the implications of the RCA for people who are not 
subject to mandatory detention and are thus entitled to seek release from an ICE 
283 2013 RCA Overview, supra note 57, at 234.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 See generally Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 
(2018).
287 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); see also Hernández, supra note 260, at 1349.
288 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
289 Id.
290 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003); Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 960; Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 
at 836; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
291 Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 960.
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officer, an immigration judge, or both."%" Parts III and IV trace the ways in which 
the RCA algorithm deviated from a true risk tool. Flaws in the RCA’s initial design 
and subsequent changes resulted in a system that recommends detention based on 
characteristics largely unrelated to risk. Accordingly, the RCA automatically 
recommends that thousands of people be detained in violation of the Constitution. 
The RCA advertises itself as fulfilling the Court’s edicts though its name and 
the labels of its constituent parts. Its methodology, however, became unmoored 
from the constitutional constraints. Nominally, the public safety component 
measures an individual’s “danger to the community”"%# and the flight risk 
component measures an individual’s likelihood of “appearance . . . at future 
immigration proceedings.”"%$ In reality, however, the RCA came to measure the 
date of entry or a prior removal order but called that measurement flight risk. Its 
public safety risk component elevates allegations of gang affiliation or a few low 
severity crimes over most other factors. Though the RCA was presented as a means 
of ensuring that immigration detention is tied to its constitutional purpose, the 
RCA’s automated custody recommendations moved further and further away from 
any basis in risk.
A low risk to public safety assessment became very difficult to attain along with 
its recommendation for release. As the RCA was modified to increase the points 
assigned to certain offenses and the maximum score for a low rating was reduced, 
the same underlying conduct was deemed riskier. The risk profile remained the same 
while the label changed from low to moderate. The FOIA results include no 
indication that this shift was in response to evidence that the offenses were tied to 
recidivism. Instead, the FOIA documents show that the goal was to minimize the 
override rate. ICE supervisors chose to detain people with certain criminal history 
even though the RCA’s initial risk logic said this history was low risk and detention 
was unnecessary. To eliminate the deviation between these two sources, the RCA’s 
designers reworked the algorithm to generate a moderate risk level instead. These 
changes allowed supervisors to detain people the RCA once considered low public 
safety risks, without having to justify their decisions. The manipulation thus 
recognized the practice by supervisors to detain absent indicators of danger and 
accommodated it.
Further, the architecture itself acknowledges that offenses designated as special 
public safety factors are overestimated and result in inaccurate assessments of risk. 
Yet these offenses generally result in a detention recommendation. Special public 
safety factors are scored equal to arson and intentional homicide. The algorithm 
recognizes that they do not in fact represent the same level of danger though. To 
arrive at its assessment of the security measures needed in custody, the RCA 
recalculates the public safety score using the actual severity levels of the special 
public safety offenses. One would expect the RCA’s recommendation with respect 
292 We note that the discussion here of the RCA’s constitutional implications is preliminary 
and deserves additional attention. We wanted to highlight, however, the profound and far-
reaching implications of the choice to divorce detention from risk in the RCA’s methodology: the 
custody of hundreds of thousands of people without a constitutional justification.
293 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
294 Id.
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to an individual’s security level in custody to avoid underestimating dangerousness. 
Instead, this score must be adjusted downward to eliminate the inflated weight given 
to these offenses in the detain/release algorithm. The high score assigned to special 
public safety factors drives detention, again, absent a corresponding level of risk.
The constitutional implications of the changes to the flight risk module are 
especially clear. By eliminating nearly all factors associated with flight risk from the 
rubric, the alterations to this algorithm render its “flight risk” levels nothing of the 
sort. The detention recommendations that result are likewise unrelated. Instead, the 
RCA aligns detention with characteristics corresponding to enforcement decisions 
not risk. The result is a brazen violation of the Constitution’s demands.
In addition, recommendations for release became harder and harder to get. By 
the end of the Obama administration, the RCA algorithm eliminated bond from its 
custody recommendations and recommended no-bond detention for more than 
double the risk classifications. Only migrants deemed low risk in both categories 
were recommended for release by the end of the Obama administration. The Trump 
administration further modified the RCA to jettison the release recommendation 
entirely."%& Even if a migrant is able to seek oversight by an immigration judge, the 
RCA recommendation of detain without bond means weeks of detention, given the 
lag between the time a migrant is processed through the RCA and her access to 
review. The same is true for the supervisor to determine recommendation when the 
decision is to detain without bond. The predictable and lengthy detention created 
by the elimination of bond and release recommendations in the RCA may not 
prevent release, but it certainly delays it. Here too, the RCA’s unconstitutional logic 
deprives people of their liberty for extended periods of time.
Moreover, the way in which the RCA was manipulated obscures the system’s 
true measures to the supervisors who are supposed to oversee it. Supervisors review 
the RCA custody recommendation based on summary outputs alone. They see 
someone designated as a high flight risk or high risk to public safety and the 
corresponding custody recommendation, but they do not see that the risk 
designation is due to entry date, the increased weight of drug possession, or 
modifications to the threshold for each level so that the designation of low risk to 
public safety became significantly harder to achieve. Not only did the RCA lose its 
constitutional footing, but it did so behind closed doors.
In the end, the RCA became a tool of immigration incarceration."%' Recent 
entry means the RCA specifically delegates to supervisors the discretion to detain 
so that detention can be widely applied with the goal of discouraging others from 
coming to the U.S., regardless of their claims for protection and low risk to public 
safety. Though the use of detention as a deterrent was rejected by a federal court 
after Obama administration lawyers cited this goal explicitly in bond hearings, and 
the Trump administration has been at pains to avoid the term, deterrence is 
embedded in the automated system designed to determine detention. The result is 
automated recommendations to detain hundreds of thousands of migrants in 
violation of the Constitution.
295 See Rosenberg & Levinson, supra note 207. 
296 Hernández, supra note 260, at 1363.
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CONCLUSION
Since 2012, ICE has relied on the country’s largest risk assessment system for 
recommendations on whom to detain and whom to release. While purporting to 
base these recommendations on indicia of risk of flight and risk to public safety, in 
reality the Risk Classification Assessment (RCA) system was manipulated to link 
detention to enforcement choices. In doing so, the system lost its underpinnings in 
the Constitution. Additionally, compromises in the RCA’s methodology thwarted 
its ability to deliver the harm reduction, transparency, and uniformity it promised. 
Ultimately, manipulation of the system’s logic resulted in recommendations to 
detain hundreds of thousands of migrants unlawfully. The RCA was heralded as a 
means of promoting alternatives to detention at a large scale and pushing back 
against the expansion of immigration detention. The RCA, however, was not 
designed in the end to measure true indicia of risk, based on established factors that 
are reevaluated and revised in light of outcomes and evidence. Nor were its 
assessments subject to review by immigration judges, advocates, and the people it 
detains. Further, until pressed through federal litigation, ICE kept its methodology 
hidden, creating opportunities for further corruption of its design. The RCA 
became a tool to impose detention on immigrants disfavored by the Obama and 
Trump administrations and to punish those groups for their presence. The failure 
of the RCA on such a dramatic scale, and the resulting harm to hundreds of 
thousands of people, calls into question the legitimacy of detention of any 
immigrant. And the subversion of its purpose from the beginning demonstrates a 
deep commitment to detention at all costs, even if the basis is feigned. 
Consequently, instead of the RCA justifying detention, the manipulation and 
mischief evident here support ending immigration detention altogether.
+
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APPENDIX
The process required to force DHS to comply with its obligations under the 
Freedom of Information Act was extensive and protracted. The authors were forced 
to spend nearly a year perfecting their administrative appeals in light of DHS’s 
delays and incomplete document production. They then spent two and a half more 
years litigating their requests in federal court and challenging compliance with a 
negotiated settlement. For those readers interested in the mechanics of the 
administrative and judicial challenges required, we have described in detail the initial 
FOIA requests that served as the basis for all subsequent challenges, as well as the 
final stipulated settlement. We also review the administrative appeals, federal 
litigation, and settlement negotiations that occurred in parallel to arrive at the final 
document production.
From the outset, we anticipated the need to sue DHS to force it to comply 
with our FOIA requests, so we drafted our initial requests to describe the 
documents we sought in various ways with as much specificity as possible. Our goal 
was to create FOIA requests that provided no room to argue that we had failed to 
request certain types of documents while also providing sufficient description and 
detail so as to be deemed reasonable and feasible requests. Accordingly, we created 
separate FOIA requests to target each major component of the RCA, based on what 
we could glean from the summary printouts Professors Robert Koulish and Mark 
Noferi had received in response to their initial requests for data on Baltimore and 
New York. The FOIA request focused on the mandatory detention module 
requested fourteen categories of documents. These included all business rules, 
criteria, protocols, scoring factors, structured fields, or lists of values for the module; 
documents discussing agency and federal court decisions addressing whether 
particular offenses were encompassed by the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA)’s provision on mandatory detention; materials discussing how the system 
would be updated to account for changes in law; and any training materials for 
officers and supervisors on how to apply the mandatory detention module and 
verify its results."%( We were concerned here that a computer was making 
complicated decisions as to whether an individual’s criminal conviction was a 
categorical match to a removal ground and if ICE officers or ICE attorneys 
reviewed this critical determination of mandatory or discretionary custody reflected 
in the RCA.
The second FOIA request focused on the methodology used to assess flight 
risk and risk to public safety."%) This request asked for all materials describing the 
scoring rubrics, the algorithm for combining the two separate assessments of risk 
into a single recommendation for detention or release."%% We also requested 
materials on the role of ICE contractors in applying the RCA, and the ability of and 
guidance to ICE officers and supervisors on reviewing and overriding the RCA 
assessment and recommendation. Additionally, this request covered documents on 
the timing of the RCA in the charging process; the use of the RCA to determine 
297 See RCA Mandatory Detention FOIA Request, supra note 26, at 5.
298 See RCA Components FOIA Request, supra note 28, at 7. 
299 Id.
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DHS bond amounts; whether the RCA incorporated criminal or medical records; 
the circumstances, if any, for re-running the RCA after its initial application; and 
guidance or protocols on modifying the RCA’s algorithms for flight risk and risk to 
public safety.#** This request was intended to reveal the meat of the RCA: what 
criteria did it use to measure flight risk and risk to public safety; how were these 
factors weighed and combined; and whether the algorithm was altered over time. 
We also wanted to understand the allocation of responsibility between man and 
machine in this process. We knew that a supervisor made a final determination 
regarding custody and bond, but we did not know the process for this final 
determination and the interaction between officers, the supervisor, and the RCA.
Our third request concerned the identification and consequence of a “special 
vulnerability.”#*# We were particularly concerned about ICE’s persistent failure to 
prevent migrants from being harmed by immigration custody and to respond to 
harms documented by detention facilities. In this request, we asked for any 
documents and other materials describing how special vulnerabilities were defined 
and assessed; how the presence of a special vulnerability interacted with the RCA’s 
other components on mandatory detention, flight risk, and risk to public safety; 
whether the special vulnerability assessment took into account the results of a 
credible or reasonable fear interview;#*" whether the RCA’s special vulnerability tool 
incorporates information from medical records or prescription medications; how 
the RCA component interacts with the agency’s obligation to report mental illness 
or disability so as to assess mental competency; whether the presence of a special 
vulnerability identified by the RCA was communicated to the detention facility; and 
the protocols, if any, for re-running the RCA based on a vulnerability identified by 
the detention facility.#*# Our goal with the first three FOIA requests was to publish 
the methodology of the RCA so that scholars and advocates could evaluate its 
300 Id.
301 See RCA Special Vulnerabilities FOIA Request, supra note 31, at 1.
302 “Asylum Officers conduct a credible fear of persecution or torture interview when a 
person who is subject to expedited removal expresses an intention to apply for asylum, expresses 
a fear of persecution or torture, or expresses a fear of return to his or her country. Any person 
subject to expedited removal who raises a claim for asylum or expresses a fear of harm or return 
will be given the opportunity to explain his or her fears to an Asylum Officer.” Credible Fear FAQ,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Oct. 15, 2008), https://www.uscis.gov/faq-page/credible-
fear-faq#t12831n40090 (discussing circumstances under which asylum officers conduct credible 
fear interviews); see also the credible fear determination provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) 
(2012) (credible fear of persecution is defined as “a significant possibility, taking into account the 
credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of his or her claim and such other facts 
as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum under Section 208 
[of the Immigration and Nationality Act]”). On the other hand, if an asylum applicant has been 
ordered removed and fears returning to the country to which the individual has been ordered 
removed, ICE must refer the individual’s case to an asylum officer who will determine the 
presence of a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. If reasonable fear is found, the applicant 
is given an opportunity to seek withholding of removal or deferral of removal before an 
immigration judge. Questions and Answers: Reasonable Fear Screenings, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (June 18, 2013), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/
questions-answers-reasonable-fear-screenings.
303 See RCA Special Vulnerabilities FOIA Request, supra note 31, at 5–8.
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efficacy in aligning civil immigration detention with its constitutional purpose and 
preventing civil detention from causing or exacerbating harm to individual migrants. 
Our other two requests focused on the outcomes of the RCA. With these 
requests, we wanted to better understand the actual impact of the RCA on who was 
detained and changes to this population over time. These FOIA requests sought the 
detailed summaries the RCA produced for all ICE field offices since the system had 
been deployed nationwide#*$ as well as a subset of detailed summaries for one of 
the field offices, which might allow us to compare a migrant’s history and case 
outcome with the RCA’s risk profile and detention recommendation.#*& All FOIA 
requests were submitted during the fall of 2014.
Additionally, we sought a waiver of associated fees for each request based on 
the likelihood that the information requested would “contribute significantly to [the] 
public understanding of the operations or activities of the government.”#*' In 
response to our requests for information on the mandatory detention component, 
risk algorithms, and detailed RCA summaries, DHS denied our petitions for fee 
waivers for four of the five requests but granted the fee waiver for our special 
vulnerabilities request, though our arguments were identical in each request.#*(
Further, we had to contend with DHS’s absurd response that it had no records 
responsive to our requests for documents describing the creation and 
implementation of the nation’s largest risk assessment system.
For the next four months, DHS and the authors disputed the timeliness and 
mootness of the various appeals and the inconsistent fee waiver decisions.#*) We 
also challenged the adequacy of DHS’s search for records responsive to our 
requests, identifying RCA documents by name and date that we were aware existed 
and listing the ICE offices DHS had failed to search.#*% Eventually, the 
administrative appeals led to production of a redacted excel spreadsheet with some, 
but not all, fields in the RCA detailed summaries, and remand of our FOIA requests 
304 See RCA Detailed Summaries Nationally FOIA Request, supra note 33, at 2.
305 See RCA Detailed Summaries for St. Paul FOIA Request, supra note 34, at 2.
306 See FOIA fee waiver provisions at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (2012); 6 C.F.R. § 5.11(k) 
(2019).
307 See Casper FAC, supra note 35, at exs. 2, 11 (E-mails from ICE FOIA Office to Katherine 
Evans regarding RCA Detailed Summaries Nationally FOIA Request and RCA Detailed 
Summaries for St. Paul FOIA Request).
308 See id. exs. 3, 12, 22 (Letters from Debbie Seguin, Chief, Gov’t Info. Law Div., ICE Off. 
of the Principal Legal Advisor, to author, regarding appeal of fee waiver denial for the RCA Risk 
Component FOIA Request on July 24, 2015, the RCA Mandatory Detention Tool FOIA Request 
on July 23, 2015, and the RCA Nationally Detailed FOIA on Feb. 3, 2015); Letter from Katherine 
Evans, Teaching Fellow, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., et al., to Gov’t Info. Law Div., U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Feb. 2, 2015) (regarding appeal of “no records responsive” for 
the RCA Mandatory Detention Tool FOIA Request No. 2015-ICAP-00117) [hereinafter Evans 
Letter re Mandatory Detention Tool] (on file with author Kate Evans); Letter from Katherine Evans, 
Teaching Fellow, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., et al., to Gov’t Info. Law Division, U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enf’t (Feb. 2, 2015) (regarding appeal of “no records responsive” for the RCA 
Components FOIA Request No. 2015-ICAP-00118 [hereinafter Evans Letter re Components Tool]
(on file with author Kate Evans).
309 Evans Letter re Components Tool, supra note 308; Evans Letter re Mandatory Detention Tool, supra
note 308. 
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on the mandatory detention tool and the risk methodology to the ICE FOIA office 
“for processing and retasking to the appropriate agency.”##* By July 2015, DHS had 
granted our fee waiver requests associated with the RCA methodology and 
mandatory detention tool### but denied a fee waiver for the RCA detailed summary 
requests on new grounds.##" Throughout the remainder of 2015, author Robert 
Koulish attempted to negotiate with DHS regarding the data fields and format for 
production of the RCA detailed summaries.###
By February 2016, we had final agency decisions on the fee waiver requests. 
Additionally, the statutory deadline had passed for responses to the remanded 
requests for information on the RCA risk methodology and mandatory detention 
tool. DHS had also refused to engage further with attempts to produce satisfactory 
data on the RCA detailed summaries in the St. Paul field office.##$ With this 
combined proof that we had exhausted our administrative remedies to enforce our 
FOIA requests, we could file a complaint in federal district court alleging that DHS 
failed to comply with the Freedom of Information Act with respect to three of our 
five FOIA requests.##& Additionally, in the fall of 2015, DHS finally responded to 
the request for materials concerning the RCA’s special vulnerabilities component.##'
The authors challenged the exemptions applied, and DHS agreed, in February 2016, 
“there may be additional non-exempt information that can be released to you.”##(
In December 2015, DHS also produced a new excel spreadsheet with data from the 
national deployment of the RCA, but continued to redact key fields.##) With the 
final agency response for the national RCA detailed summaries in hand and the 
elapse of the statutory deadline for the remand of the special vulnerabilities request, 
pro bono counsel filed an amended complaint in May 2016 consolidating our 
challenges to production, redaction, and fee waivers for all five of our requests.##%
As a result, we could pursue consolidated settlement negotiations with an assistant 
U.S. attorney under the threat of discovery and judicial review in federal court.
310 See Casper FAC, supra note 35, exs. 20, 34 (Final Response Letters from Catrina M. Pavlik-
Keenan, FOIA Officer to Katherine Evans, Univ. of Minn. Law. Sch., concerning St. Paul RCA 
Detailed Summaries FOIA Request No. 2015-ICFO-02993 on Apr. 9, 2015 and RCA Detailed 
Summaries FOIA Request No. 2015-ICFO-03004 on Apr. 7, 2015); see also id. exs. 9, 17 (Letters 
from Debbie Seguin, Chief, Gov’t Information Law Division to Katherine Evans, Univ. of Minn. 
Law Sch., remanding RCA FOIA Request Nos. 2015-ICFO-03041/2015-ICAP-00118/2015-
ICAP-00276 and RCA FOIA Request Nos. 2015-ICFO-03027/2015-ICAP-00117/2015-ICAP-
00277, both on Apr. 23, 2015).
311 Id. exs. 26, 28; Letter from Debbie Seguin, Chief, Gov’t Info. Law Div., to Katherine 
Evans, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. (July 7, 2015) (reconsidering denial of RCA Methodology and 
Mandatory Detention Tool FOIA Request Nos. 2015-ICFO-00434/2015-ICAP-02993).
312 See Casper FAC, supra note 35, ex. 21; Complaint at ex. 24–25, Casper v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 0:16-cv-00380 (D. Minn. Feb. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Casper Complaint].
313 See Casper FAC, supra note 35, exs. 28–33, 39–41; Casper Complaint, supra note 312, ex. 31.
314 See Casper Complaint, supra note 312, at 13.
315 See id. at 2.
316 See Casper FAC, supra note 35, exs. 46–47.
317 See id. ex. 48.
318 See id. at 28.
319 See generally id.
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The district court litigation prompted a far swifter and more comprehensive 
response to our FOIA requests. The Assistant U.S. Attorney offered a series of 
document production covering the three requests for information on the RCA’s 
design.#"* As this production progressed, the parties were also subject to a court-
ordered discovery schedule and settlement conference. In the end, we entered a 
stipulated settlement agreement the day before the Trump administration took
office. This agreement guaranteed production of specified documents we learned 
existed through the initial disclosures negotiated in 2016; production of substantially 
similar documents to the ones identified; certification that certain categories of 
documents do not exist if they were not produced; a summary of 1.4 million RCA 
entries with limited data fields, and a total of 2500 RCA entries with expanded data 
fields.#"# This production occurred over the course of 2017 and 2018, resulting in 
over 1700 pages, printouts of the RCA online training course for ICE officers, 
matrices of the RCA’s algorithm and scoring rubric for evaluating risk and 
recommending detention including every change during the first five years.#""
Finally, DHS certified that it had produced all existing documents, if any, relating 
to (1) guidance given to supervisors on when they may override the RCA 
recommendations, (2) protocols on how ICE officers enter information on crimes 
that would indicate they are subject to mandatory detention, and (3) all training 
materials and protocols on communication between detention facilities and RCA 
users regarding a migrant’s special vulnerabilities.#"# We sought this certification as 
a way to prove the negative: if DHS did not produce information relating to these 
areas, no guidance or protocols existed.
After challenging DHS’s compliance with the stipulated settlement,#"$ the 
agency’s final data production in May 2018 at last revealed the RCA’s algorithm and 
its changes over time. With this data plus the background documents, we could 
320 See Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, FOIA Officer, to Shannon Bjorklund, Dorsey 
& Whitney LLP (Aug. 10, 2016) (on file with authors); Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, 
FOIA Officer, to Emily Mawer, Dorsey & Whitney LLP (June 6, 2016) (on file with authors); 
Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, FOIA Officer, to Emily Mawer, Dorsey & Whitney LLP 
(May 4, 2016) (on file with authors).
321 See Stipulation of Settlement & Dismissal, supra note 38, at 2–6.
322 See CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 19; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra
note 58; RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 94.
323 See Letter Concerning Casper Case, supra note 40.
324 See E-mail from Ann Bildtsen, Assistant U.S. Att’y, U.S. Att’y’s Off. Dist. Minn., to Colin 
Wicker, Senior Att’y, Dorsey & Whitney LLP (May 24, 2018, 08:58 CDT) (on file with authors); 
E-mail from Ann Bildtsen, Assistant U.S. Att’y, U.S. Att’y’s Off. Dist. Minn., to Colin Wicker, 
Senior Att’y, Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Apr. 12, 2018, 17:16 CDT) (on file with authors); E-mail 
from Ann Bildtsen, Assistant U.S. Att’y, U.S. Att’y’s Off. Dist. Minn., to Colin Wicker, Senior 
Att’y, Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 9, 2018, 11:03 CDT) (on file with authors); Letter from Colin 
Wicker, Senior Att’y, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, to Ann Bildtsen, Assistant U.S. Att’y, U.S. Att’y’s 
Off. Dist. Minn. (Dec. 19, 2017) (on file with authors); Letter from Colin Wicker, Senior Att’y, 
Dorsey & Whitney LLP, to Ann Bildtsen, Assistant U.S. Att’y, U.S. Att’y’s Off. Dist. Minn. (Aug. 
14, 2017) (on file with authors); Letter from Colin Wicker, Senior Att’y, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 
to Ann Bildtsen, Assistant U.S. Att’y, U.S. Att’y’s Off. Dist. Minn. (May 26, 2017) (on file with 
authors). 
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begin analyzing the RCA’s role in determining the custody of hundreds of 
thousands of migrants every year.
